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HARVEY MANSFIELD 
AND VIRTUE IN THE ARID LAND OF MODERN LIBERALISM
“No cause is ever lost, because none is ever won.”
Thomas Stearns Eliot
Harvey C. Mansfield is one of the most distinguished American political philoso-
phers writing today, standing at the very center of a bitter debate over the ultimate 
meaning of political life in modernity, and here, arguably the most prominent con-
servative academic teaching in a major American university. Mansfield is usually 
described as a conservative, or in recent years as neoconservative, due to the pro-
minence some of his alleged students achieved in the ranks of George W. Bush’s 
administration. But this is a very inadequate label, unless it is intended to mean, 
in general, that he is not a liberal in the contemporary use of the word in America, 
and that he has had many students who have achieved public prominence, also in 
the conservative ranks. Mansfield in a personal description of his thought concurs 
with being labeled as a conservative, using the equivocal understatement that “some 
people, with some reason, call [me] a conservative”.1 But whatever the merits and 
demerits of such a description, it seems too narrow, and thus woefully incomplete. 
Mansfield’s range of thought and writings is so wide, so versatile, and his presence 
as a public intellectual commenting on various aspects of contemporary cultural and 
political life so ubiquitous, that it would be difficult to compress his intellectual and 
public activities in such a way as to put on it a definite conservative identification.
Mansfield received his B.A. in 1953 and Ph.D. in 1961 in government from 
Harvard University, and except for a brief stint of teaching at the University of 








California at Berkeley in the early 1960s, his entire professional and public care-
er has been connected with Harvard, where he is currently William R. Kennan Jr. 
Professor of government. At Harvard Mansfield studied with such known political 
scientists as Carl J. Friedrich and Samuel Beer, but gradually came under the spell 
of a political philosopher Leo Strauss. In fact he can be counted as one of the most 
sophisticated thinkers among the Straussian students. They form a distinctive scho-
ol, an extremely varied, divided one – sometimes bitterly – nevertheless constituting 
one of the most influential intellectual currents of contemporary political philoso-
phy, in opposition to the so-called political science dominating universities today.
From Leo Strauss Mansfield learned something rarely present among Ameri-
can scholars in political science departments already then, and nearly extinct today, 
increasingly enamored with their quantitative, computing methods of analysis of 
things political. These are methods which treat human political activity as an object 
of scrutiny commensurate somehow with biologists’ description of a beehive. He le-
arned an appreciation of a philosophical dimension of politics, ancient and modern, 
and a deep understanding of the intractable nature of the moral dimension of human 
action, non-reducible to behavioral reflexes, and non-responsive to the social engi-
neering methods of the modern administrative state. This was an approach treating 
human nature as a moral entity radically separated, by the very fact of moral reaso-
ning over an essence of its own true existence, from the materialistic image of it.
In such a perspective, modern liberalism as “science”, with its corresponding 
help of social sciences such as positivism, historicism or behavioralism, as a kind 
of administrative enterprise responding to the exigencies of raw facts of human life 
in this as sheer animality, looked woefully inadequate. For Strauss it was obvious 
that the ultimate error of liberalism is ontological and anthropological, not techni-
cal, the latter being merely a consequence of the former. Strauss’s influence was 
truly transforming, since he seemed to thwart singlehandedly the corrupting slide 
of the American approach to politics, society, philosophy and culture into an abyss 
of positivism, historicism and behavioralism, a depressing end station of Western 
humanities. Mansfield has contributed immensely to humanities created within the 
Straussian paradigm, establishing it as a powerful and increasingly legitimate rival 
to the philosophical and political liberal monism within which positivism, histori-
cism and behavioralism increasingly began to be taken for granted. An understan-
ding of the Straussian paradigm thus seems to be crucial to the very understanding 
of the magnitude and influence of Mansfield’s achievement.
Educational Lightness of Being and the Moral Illegitimacy 
of the Modern Regime
Mansfield has become in intellectual life one of the most influential Straussians. 
Teaching at Harvard University, he has influenced a tremendous number of scho-
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lars, community organizers and religious people. He has gone against the whole tra-
dition of political science as “science” and against corruption of higher education, its 
slant towards political correctness and its visible slide in students’ assessments into 
mediocrity criteria, a crazy assumption about equality as a result and as a right, not 
as a starting point. In addition Mansfield gradually had to face a certain situation at 
the university. For him relativism’s attack on free thought, the conviction that abso-
lute tolerance, that is New Tolerance understood as ideology and a ban on all moral 
distinctions by virtue of excellence, was a grave danger not only to moral education, 
which per se requires precisely that judgments be made, but a danger to free thought 
as such. In other words it constituted a danger to human freedom and a declaration 
that nihilism was the essence of education, supervised of course by those who know 
exactly at a particular place and time which shape of nihilism and politically correct 
causes of the moment are fashionable and which, for the time being, excluded from 
its province. 
This constituted an unprecedented slide to barbarism not only of thinking, 
but barbarism of moral intuition, a rejection of all cultures, religions, moral systems 
and distinctions fundamental to human Being. To make such distinctions one needs 
not only rigorous thinking, but also a certain moral gravity, a minimum of solidity, 
of treating life as a serious thing. There thus has to be a conviction that the world in 
which we live is worth something, that the world in which we conduct our affairs, the 
world of our experience had an innate value. This is in essence a groundwork for moral 
education, that is virtue, understood as a general value, or disposition to derive from 
the existing reality a sense transcending the senseless existence of the contentious hu-
man animal. Virtus nobilitat: virtue gives nobility and civilizes. It is at the same time 
a prerequisite of human bonding, of solidarity, since it assumes the common hu-
manity of all striving towards a goal which transcends immediate, individual ple-
asures. This is a perspective which claims that there are things worth sacrificing, 
and things which are worth living for, because of their inner, objective, universal 
moral value. 
Modernity constituted a rebellion against virtue as conceived both by the 
ancients and Christianitas, beginning one of the most fascinating debates in the 
history of philosophy, education, politics, constituting a major front line of human 
approaches to reality. The ancients and Christianity, in various ways, took the me-
aningful and rich notion of nature as a standard for individual persons and human 
societies, as far as morals and also institutional arrangements were concerned. The 
moderns, in equally various ways, came to regard nature, exactly at that moment 
hen modern science was accelerating its knowledge of the universe, as something 
which was either indifferent or even hostile to human beings. As a consequence, 
nature ceased to be regarded as being any standard of behavior for humans. In other 
words it provided little or no guidance in human affairs. That meant that morality 
was to come either from fiat grounded in religious precepts, or, once they were 
rejected, grounded in an autonomous reason unguided by anything outside of it. As 
26 ANDRZEJ BRYK
a result, also all human endeavors, including political ones, acquired an unlimited 
potential. This potential was limited only by either incapabilities of reason to over-
come its own barriers, or the atrophy of the will to use it and change the world. To 
wit, since modernity’s ascent, everything in reality has been up for grabs, to form it 
according to precepts born in an autonomous mind. The “self” became sovereign, 
moral autocreation its servant.
In such a perspective learning is a purely conventional affair, and tolerance 
of all opinions its natural outcome, with relativism and ultimately nihilism surrep-
titiously creeping in. Liberal democracy’s slide towards relativism and nihilism is 
an outcome of this general theory of education rooted in modernity’s methodology 
starting with moral autocreation, the last best thing of a desperate mind rejecting 
moral sense and accepting cosmos’s utter meaninglessness. But this slide towards 
nihilism and relativism is never stated per se, openly; it is always wrapped in mo-
dern clichés and banalities, sentimentality posing as morality and empathy, to wit 
a satire posing as drama. It is totally decoupled from the great sagas of humanity, 
its heroic myths reflecting human essences as something bigger than the immediate 
desires of the body. These essences are deprived of any sense of a soul, which con-
stituted a definition of human elevation from the animality of the bodily desires, 
even if justified by reason. It was this human elevation, this incessant urge to look 
up, in other words to thirst for being better than one is, which created a need for 
Great Books as repositories of wisdom which never fails. Students not only do not 
have any image of a solid of a soul bigger than their immediate desires. They do 
not even imagine, as Allan Bloom observed, that there is such a thing as something 
bigger than their immediate wants. There is emptiness at the center of their lives and 
a great proclivity to any idolatry of the body, the soul and the mind, an especially 
tragic condition, since so easily captured by the cynical, capable of imposing any 
authority on their confused minds.
Such a condition is not only impoverishing, it is also dangerous. Propelled 
by this desire of unlimited autocreation of its actors, society has an inexorable ten-
dency to slide towards a cacophony of mere opinions tamed by an administrative, 
utilitarian policeman, that is a state. Science in the service of will began to give this 
project efficacy. It was a burning wish to escape from this corrupt, imperfect world. 
Modernity subconsciously locates “permanent” things always in the future of perso-
nal history. Once arriving there, people realize that permanence turns out to be just 
a fleeting moment in time and in consciousness, convinced that things “permanent” 
were an illusion, but never giving up locating them in the future again. Modernity 
in this sense is by its own logic profoundly countercultural, revolutionary. Because 
of this rebellious disposition of modernity, reality is in a constant danger of being 
defined by all kinds of daring and cunning usurpers, entrepreneurial, experimenting 
people using all available ideological, political, economic and moral means to im-
pose their image of the world on the other.
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Modernity has thus always been prone to a constant redefinition of reality 
and human life itself in terms of ideology of a particular time and place in history, 
even if it has often been understood as an escape from the ravages of it. It has been 
an incessant attempt to defy and deny reality, and with it man’s objective existence 
in time, a temptation to reject life as such, with a corresponding assault on morali-
ty. “Liberation” from life and morality defining the human predicament and giving 
it a meaningful basis has been its driving logic, a revolt against ontology as such, 
a consuming fever to save oneself by one’s own means, quintessentially baron Mün-
chhausen’s dream.
The question of a universal basis of behavior, that is morality justified from 
outside of the human autonomous “self”, loomed here paramount. The problem 
of morality, thus also virtues shaping character, irrespective of individual choices 
seeking desires, virtues creating a community of mutual obligations not stemming 
from a contract or utilitarian means, and thus virtues creating human solidarity as 
a moral disposition not just as a legal obligation, which is always spurious to susta-
in that obligation, seemed to be a problem which could not be avoided.
Modernity posed in this context a definite problem for politics and a “regi-
me” in Aristotle’s sense of the world. And here we enter a terrain where Mansfield 
has become one of the most vocal and brilliant intellectual warriors. A “regime” 
has begun to be looked upon in modernity not as a means to a definite moral end 
or ends, deemed now impossible to achieve, but rather as a system of institutional 
arrangements in which individuals could pursue their ideas of happiness, that is 
their subjective notions of a good life. That means, in practice, that an individual 
interest coming from the moral autonomy of the “self” defines totality of human 
existential goals.
A political order is conceived in such an ontological and anthropological vi-
sion merely as a neutral arena of the best environment to achieve political stability, 
with rights expressing different shades of such individual desires. In the contem-
porary world the latter are increasingly becoming surreptitiously commensurate 
with human dignity, a situation creating a new anthropological perspective. In its 
light man becomes someone who is defining himself and demanding unequivocal 
recognition of such a desire as being equal to his human dignity. A state becomes 
in such a case a great stabilizer and watchman of a political order, and the rising 
prominence of judges reflects this desire of an administrative state to recognize this 
totality of humanity expressed in rights immediately.2 But such rights mean essen-
tially interests, and this is where political philosophy turns into political science. 
Inspired by a famous title of a book by Harold D. Lasswell, published in 1935, 
Politics: Who Gets What, When, How?, political science as Mansfield observes 
focuses
2 See on that for instance: P. Manen t, A World Beyond Politics?: A Defence of the Nation State, Princ-
eton 2006, p. 98–129, 171–196; R. H i r s ch, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism, Cambridge Mass. 2004, p. 1–8, 149–210.
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on the benefits you get – what, when, and how. It ought to be on the who – on who you 
think you are and why you are so important as to deserve what you get. Poets (speaking broadly of 
all literature) and philosophers have the answer or at least address the question; science does not. 
The ambition of political science to be scientific in the manner of natural science is the reason why 
it ignores the question of importance. Scientific truth is objective and is no respecter of persons; it 
regards the concern for importance as a source of bias, the enemy of truth. Individuals in science can 
claim prizes, nations can take pride in them, but this sort of recognition is outside science, which is 
in principle and fact a collective, anonymous enterprise. Political science, which by studying politics 
ought to be sensitive to importance, to the importance of importance, aims to abstract from individual 
data with names in order to arrive at universal propositions. Yet human beings and their associations 
always have names; this is how they maintain their individuality. Names mark off the differences be-
tween individuals and societies or other groups, and they do so because the differences are important 
to us. You can think your way to an abstract individual or society without a name, but you cannot be 
one or live in one. Science is indifferent to proper names, and confines itself to common nouns, but 
all human life takes place in an atmosphere of proper nouns. “To make a name for yourself,” as we 
say, is to become important. “To lose your good name,” to suffer a stain on your reputation, is to live 
thinking less well of yourself, or among others who think less well of you. Does this matter? It appears 
that human beings like to think they are important. Perhaps they have to think so if they are to live 
responsibly, for how can you do your duties if they are not ascribed to your name?3
In such a perspective liberal politics becomes reduced, to use the language 
of social sciences, to preferences, suggesting a momentary or fleeting interest, a co-
nvenient desire that can easily be changed and rationally justified, as circumstances, 
time, or place may demand. But for Mansfield politics is about much deeper and 
more fundamental human motivations, motivations that liberal democracy has great 
difficulty explaining and accounting for, motivations which cause all of us to strive 
for honor, glory, victory, that is something bigger than the immediate security of 
living. Such goals cannot be reduced to a set of mere “preferences”. A contemporary 
liberal approach to politics makes it difficult to understand not only culture or cul-
tures, but first of all it excludes a possibility of understanding fundamental aspects 
of human existence which show themselves in the public space, treating them either 
as prejudice or a dangerous imposition of private passion illegitimate in the public 
sphere.
There is no doubt for Mansfield that this is not only an error of judgment, 
but an error which stems from a liberal anthropology per se which is wrong, limi-
ted and in fact dangerous for politics, treating such facts of human existence as 
honor, pride, love or faith as mere preferences. Reason in such a case reduces itself 
to scientific, technological, shallow exercises justifying in fact desires, and then 
construing institutions, education and laws to accommodate such desires, which 
are left to themselves and cannot be subjected to any process of elevation, sophisti-
cation, lifting above the is sheer animality of the momentary. Reason then becomes 
simply a slave of the rudest kind of desires, in a process defining human existence 
only by what is immediate and reducing itself to just a utilitarian tool of order. But 
3 H. C. Mans f i e ld, How to Understand Politics: What the Humanities Can Say to Science, Jefferson 
Lecture in the Humanities 2007.
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desires pertain to animals, and animality recognized as a fact of life from which we 
start building order not contaminated by metaphysics, the axiom taken for granted 
by the first moderns like Machiavelli or Hobbes, became in due time all there is to 
political life and anthropology.
Mansfield is a modern man. He recognizes the sheer pressure of desires and 
interests on humans, but together with the authors of the Federalists Papers and 
Alexis de Tocqueville he thinks that interest should be, after Tocqueville’s phrase, 
“well understood”. This phrase “implies that your right or true or correct interest in-
cludes honor and ambition, though they seem contrary to it. But the words well un-
derstood, translating Tocqueville’s bien entendu, allow for the possibility that your 
interest might accommodate or coexist with something contrary to it. Tocqueville 
does not adopt ‘self-interest well understood’ on his own account but attributes it to 
Americans. Following him my ambition is not to supplant the idea of self-interest 
but only to supplement it with a remainder of what is buried beneath it”.4 Mansfield 
applies to this “what is beneath it”, that is honor, ambition, pride, courage, modera-
tion, fame, the ancient word thumos “which is basic to courage”, and delineates its 
contours in the face of the shallow liberal political or wider, social sciences.5
But he is too wise a thinker not to recognize the limitations of this concept 
for an explanation of human existence, and here he is forced to add to his classical 
understanding, a metaphysical dimension which is inescapably connected with the 
Jewish and Christian tradition and their concepts of one personal God. For Mans-
field it is obvious that there is a tension between such a classical notion of politics 
with thumos at its centre and this metaphysical dimension, with the former enri-
ching the liberal limited perspective, but still being inadequate to account for the 
richness of human existence. Thumos stems from our inner selves and our achieve-
ments, and, however it enlarges our understanding of ourselves and others acting in 
a public square, it can never account for a deeper urge, in fact a metaphysical one, 
represented for instance by love and faith, which are simply inexplicable in terms 
of desires, interests or facts discernable in human life. 
Thumos is often at cross purposes with them. As Mansfield writes, 
when you open your soul to God, you can be tempted, prompted by thumos, to believe that 
God is on your side, instead of wanting to put yourself on God’s side. If only love were by itself, 
and not hitched to thumos, no one would care if his love were not returned. But because of thumos, 
we do care, and often demand it. Needless to say, neither love nor anger at unrequited love can be 
explained by self-interest.6
Metaphysical humility is required. Thumos, although extending itself bey-
ond self-interest and pure utilitarian motives, is prone to shape the outside world 
through the lenses of feelings and love which has a lot to do with the love of one-
4 Mansfield replies to his critics, “First Things”, December 2007, p. 10.
5 H.C. Mans f i e ld, How to Understand Politics...
6 Mansfield replies to his critics..., p. 10.
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self, even if masked in the veil of courage, honor, personal pride defined as impor-
tance and recognition, even faith in God. 
But the very essence of religious faith – at least Judeo-Christian faith – is 
that “religion reveals to us that we are important for God because of what God did 
for us – giving us his law, or redeeming us on the cross – not because of our own 
achievements”,7 but because of God’s grace and our understanding of the very limi-
ted time we have here, and our limited abilities to make ultimate sense of our lives. 
Man in other words cannot explain himself to himself, thus a fairly limited appli-
cation for such a task in contemporary liberal politics, of concepts enlarging the 
understanding of human beings beyond sheer utility and self-interest like thumos, 
in which reason itself interacts with self-interest and desire in a way transcending 
the solitude of human existence. As a consequence it is obvious that not only libe-
ral politics and political philosophy, but any politics and in fact philosophy per se, 
cannot be the answer to human fulfillment and final emotional rest.
Liberalism has landed itself in an especially precarious situation since it can-
not provide any, even limited, justification of its citizens’ existence other than self-
interest which is the other side of a glorification of an autonomous self’s desire to 
create one’s morality by a process of autocreation and self-salvation. Liberalism 
becomes here more a late child of Nietzsche than Kant, whose project of creating 
objective morality outside of metaphysics, a.k.a. religion failed. But Mansfield is 
too wise not to be aware that a return to the ancients, to Socrates, Plato or Aristotle, 
to thumos or other virtues, will not do to rectify this fundamental problem at the 
center of modern liberalism. The ancients themselves sensed that too, yearning for 
a fulfillment which their own limited philosophical arsenal could not provide, but 
they readied for it the very culture itself. 
Mansfield realizes that modern society cannot escape a predicament the En-
lightenment and liberalism allegedly thought themselves capable of transcending. 
It is this yearning for meaning and metaphysical dimension which simply cannot 
be done away with, even if sublimated into all kinds of false gods of multitude 
progressive, mundane causes. The Enlightenment did not do away with any fun-
damental mysteries of human existence, neither were the ancients capable of doing 
that with their much more elevated approach to communal and personal life. The 
Enlightenment, and with it liberalism, are imprisoned within their narrow circle of 
self-referential arguments, more and more refined and more and more geared to 
the mild, prosperous and less and less cruel civilization, but at the same time more 
and more vacuous, when everything can happen and nothing matters. Mansfield 
is very aware of this void at the centre of the liberal civilization, and although his 
main concern is rather that of political philosophy and constitutional politics than of 
a moralist, there is this unexpressed hidden metaphysical dimension to his thought, 
or an awareness of its lack.
7 R. B raque, Political Misunderstanding, “First Things”, December 2007, p. 6.
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Tocqueville is Mansfield’s hero, and it is hard to find better company for un-
derstanding modern liberal democracy. But even so, Mansfield shares with Tocqu-
eville this hopelessness which the latter expressed in his most bitter and terrifying 
comments about pantheism as the religion of despair of the modern man. Political 
philosophy, irrespective of how much it probes deeper and deeper about the moti-
ves of human behavior and how much it searches for the sources of the immutable 
human conduct stemming from nature, cannot define that nature, cannot impose 
the ultimate meaning on it. Mansfield would share here an observation with the late 
Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski. Kołakowski is treated by modern liberal 
thinkers as a religious philosopher, which is imprecise. Although Kołakowski is not 
necessarily a religious thinker he is definitely a metaphysical philosopher, realizing 
this unrelieved horror metaphysicus lurking beyond the modern liberal mind. He 
knows, and Mansfield would definitely concur, that the human condition, with all 
its evil and unintended consequences, with all its glory and greatness, remains in-
explicable, incomprehensible, void and senseless and ultimately breeding despair, 
if it is not looked at through the lenses of the sacred history in time, its story of sin 
and redemption, of fall and resurrection, of narcissism and human self-importance 
and love transcending it all. This is this silent, but nevertheless present dimension 
of Mansfield’s efforts, to make the arid liberal civilization of today more congruent 
with the deeper urges of the human soul and nature, the same urge which provoked 
the ancients to decouple nature from moral reasoning and set off a search for a me-
aning of allegedly meaningless and silent cosmos.
Virtue, Moral Freedom and the Liberal Autonomous “Self”
In all walks of life Mansfield has become one of the most politically minded Straus-
sians and most relevant to practical politics, and at the same time one of the most 
philosophically grounded students of modern politics. He is first of all a political 
philosopher. In this age of positivism, neo-Marxism, behavioralism and many other 
-isms, regnant at the humanities and political science departments of major Western 
universities, to be a classical political philosopher seems a little bit of an oddity, sin-
ce it assumes certain ontological and anthropological assumptions about the human 
condition, which modern science, including political science, has allegedly over-
come as useless analytical tools. As one of the most challenging critics of contem-
porary liberalism and modernity living in America, Mansfield tries to recover the 
truly moral, universal dimension of communal life, and puts at its centre the issue 
of virtue, difficult to contemplate in this age of individualism.
As a political philosopher, however, Mansfield can be better described, it 
seems to me, as someone who decided to subject to intellectual scrutiny the false 
intellectual and moral pretensions of contemporary political science, this modern 
version of social thought, possibly the most “scientific” pretence of modern mana-
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gerial liberalism. It subjects the rich and unpredictable reality of human existence 
in a polis to mechanical categories of thought and action, exhibiting a hidden desire 
to treat human beings as pawns in a game to reach a perfect society of ultima-
te justice and equality according to liberal images of them. These are images of 
a particular place and time, defined in terms of allegedly objective facts about re-
ality and human existence. They are deemed necessary to attain a “good”, tolerant 
society, so as to overcome conflict which must allegedly occur when we focus on 
the truth of human existence, instead of on the utility of such an existence in rela-
tion to others in a well administered state. Thus, as Mansfield writes in one of his 
most succinct, little great books, politics is partisan: it means taking side. Not only 
are there sides, but they also argue against each other since each side defends
defends its own interests…arguments good or bad, are made with reasons and so aimed 
implicitly, if not usually, at a reasonable judge. Here is where political philosophy enters. Most 
people reason badly, but they do reason – and political philosophy starts from this fact. I stress the 
connection between politics and political philosophy because such a connection is not to be found 
in the kind of political science that tries to ape the natural science. That political science, which do-
minates political science departments today, is a rival to political philosophy. Instead of addressing 
the partisan issues of citizens and politicians, it avoids them and replaces their words with scientific 
terms. Rather than good, just, and noble, you hear political scientists of this kind speaking of utility 
or preferences. These terms are meant to be neutral, abstracted from partisan disputes. Instead of 
serving as judge of what is good, just or noble, such political scientists conceive themselves to be 
disinterested observers, as if they had no stake in the outcomes of politics. As political scientists, 
they believe they must suppress their opinions as citizens lest they contaminate their scientific 
selves. The political philosopher, however, takes a stand with Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859), 
who said that while he himself was not partisan, he undertook to see, not differently, but further than 
the parties. To sum up: political philosophy seeks to judge political partisans, but to do so it must 
enter into political debate. It wants to be impartial, or to be a partisan for the whole, for the common 
good; but that impartiality is drawn from the arguments of the parties themselves by extending their 
claims and not by standing aloof from them, divided between scientists and citizen, half slave to 
science, half rebel from it. Being involved in partisan dispute does not make the political philoso-
pher fall victim to relativism, for the relativism so fashionable today is a sort of lazy dogmatism. 
These relativists refuse to enter into political debate because they are sure even before hearing the 
debate that it cannot be resolved; they believe like the political scientists they otherwise reject that 
nothing can be just or good or noble unless everyone agrees. The political philosopher knows for 
sure that politics will always be debatable, whether the debate is open or suppressed, but that fact – 
rather welcome when you reflect on it – does not stop him from seeking a common good that might 
be too good for everyone to agree with. Political philosophy reaches for the best regime, a regime so 
good that it can hardy exist. Political science advances a theory – in fact a number of theories – that 
promises to bring agreement and put an end to partisan dispute. The one rises above partisanship, 
the other, as we shall see, undercuts it.8
This separation of political science from political philosophy occurred in the 
seventeenth century, but the radical separation was part of the positivist movement 
of the late nineteenth century, when political science declared itself totally distinct 
and as “science” separate from metaphysical alleged “nonsense”. But political phi-
8 H. C. Mans f i e ld  Jr., Political Philosophy, Wilmington DE 2001, p. 2–9.
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losophy, although deeply entrenched, has not disappeared from universities, and 
the more or less hostile controversy between political science and political phi-
losophy today within university departments stems directly from this earlier rift. 
Political science has a tendency to consider itself to be dealing with facts, being 
just descriptive, or empirical, when in its judgment political philosophy was called 
normative because it expressed values. But such a division occurred even within 
political science. Soon, especially in the wake of the great 1960s cultural revolution, 
political science began to accommodate schools which professed their “proper”, 
non-metaphysical values, as contrasted with the usually “improper”, a.k.a. meta-
physical, or essentialist values of political philosophy. The first values were good 
and needed to be encouraged, for instance participatory democracy of non-discrimi-
native society, the goals towards which the whole apparatus of social sciences was 
soon to be adjusted.
The controversy rooted originally in the positivist ascendancy in the nine-
teenth century repeats itself, in Mansfield’s view, in more abstract terms between 
political science, which is focused on reaching agreement or political order whate-
ver it may be, and political philosophy, which seeks the best regime. In such a case 
political science likes to stress facts since it thinks it possible to agree on facts as 
opposed to values which are difficult to reconcile, when political philosophy put 
forth values or norms because it looks for the best normative order. But when
contrast[ing] political science and political philosophy we are really speaking of two kinds of 
political philosophy, modern and ancient. To appreciate the political science we have now, we need 
to look at its rival; to do that, we must enter into the history of political philosophy. We must study 
the tradition that has been handed down to us. The great political philosophers read the works of their 
predecessors and commented on them, sometimes agreeing, often disagreeing. This history has less of 
the accidental in it than other history because, to a much greater degree than citizens or statesmen, phi-
losophers are reflecting upon, and reacting to, thinkers that came before them. In considering the history 
of Western civilization, one must not forget the tradition of Western thought that inspires and explains 
the actions of peoples and statesmen. It is both more and less than a tradition in the usual sense – more, 
as it is more thoughtful, and less, being divided against itself and open to argument and correction. The 
tradition of political philosophy is not a sequence of customs; still less is it a ‘canon’ established by 
some dominant political power, as is sometimes said. It is the only tradition that does not claim to be an 
authority, that on the contrary constantly questions authority; unlike the various non-Western traditions, 
it is non exclusive and not peremptory. It is philosophic. No one can count himself educated who does 
not have some acquaintance with this tradition. It informs you of the leading possibilities of human life, 
and by giving you a sense of what has been tried and of what is now dominant, it tells you where we are 
now in a depth not available from any other source. Much political theory today feels no obligation to 
examine its history and sometimes looks down on the history of the subject as if it could not be a matter 
of current interest. But our reasoning shows that the history of political philosophy is required for under-
standing its substance. In recent decades the political science profession has been subject to successive 
new theories such as behavioralism and rational choice, each of which promises to put an end to the old 
debates over values and do away with political philosophy. But somehow political philosophy survives, 
despite efforts to supersede it, just as, despite the failure of those efforts, political science in the modern 
sense re-emerges periodically to make another try at bringing consensus and doing away with debate.9
9 Ibidem.
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For Mansfield, in a true Straussian tradition, contemporary liberalism seems 
inherently saddled with grave wrong assumptions about human nature, and it is for 
that reason that the liberal project has evidently shown signs of utter exhaustion. 
As an attempt to develop accounts of morality in the name of some impersonal 
standards in response to the loss of shared practices necessary for the discovery 
of moral goods in common, that is some form of modern virtues, liberalism se-
ems to fail. Morality based on a search by the autonomous moral subject for some 
common moral bond cannot sustain itself. The rational rules of the social contract 
coming from Hobbes through John Rawls cannot give rise to morally sustainable 
obligations, especially its justice principle, since they in fact constitute a particular 
form of utilitarian self-rationality of an autonomous subject. This self-rationality is 
incapable of overcoming the problem of why such a state should be obeyed in the 
first place, and why it should not be treated as just an object of a constant demand 
for goods, fulfilling a desire of a moment defined as a modern pursuit of happiness. 
Such a society constantly has to face the dilemma why it is more reasonable to fulfill 
a contract than to pretend that one does it.10
Liberalism of the modern welfare state based on a social contract cannot create 
non-egotistical motives in societies as such, in fact corrupts them, pretending that it is 
just. Human emotions are often more wise than reason, superstitions express human 
feelings and moral predispositions better than rational constructions. The ideas of 
justice created rationally by the social planners and bureaucrats tend rather to corrupt 
human souls than to induce them to justice and other virtues. The mills of justice, as 
William Blackstone observed, are fuelled by emotions, in fact, strictly speaking by 
love, the inculcated disposition to do good, that is to be virtuous. An elimination of 
social processes, which create moral passions from bottom up in autonomous institu-
tions, the only place where one can teach people how to love, can never be substitu-
ted by the rational plans of elites, who know best what the just social life and morality 
of all should look like. 
To think that people can be induced to behave justly on the basis of a rational, 
general plan of social behavior is the greatest fallacy of the modern liberal mind, in-
capable of providing any basis of virtuous behavior. People cannot be convinced why 
they should think first of all about others. A need for sentiments, caritas, magnanimi-
ty, sympathy and other virtues can only be explained on a basis of unreflexive moral 
impulses. It was for this reason that William Shakespeare in King Lear understood 
well that love and sympathy precede justice. When virtues are rationally concocted 
by the social planners, reason will find ways to justify injustice – this is a common-
sense observation. The rational “scientific” plan how a just society should look is 
just the way bureaucrats want to devise their image of the perfect society. It also 
constitutes an utter disdain towards the common people, their passions and loves, 
different loyalties and attachments, people who are allegedly incapable of governing 
themselves, that is disdain of the basic right of a democratic-constitutional govern-
10 R. Sc ru ton, Modern Philosophy, New York 1996, p. 39.
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ment, the right of consent.11 Mansfield is quite aware of the inherent limitations of 
the liberal project, because it disregards the very ancient, classical and Christian qu-
estion how to explain the conditionality of humanity and above all its conditionality 
in history, a question that is a starting point for all transcendence. This philosophical 
question was disregarded in modernity, even if Kant accepted a possibility of the 
latter’s existence. But the practical problem of the common good could not be ade-
quately explained, because no common standards can be sustained when they are 
abstracted from the practices and descriptions that render our lives meaningful and 
comprehensible. In other words, it is modern liberal moral, dominant philosophy 
itself which becomes not the solution, but the problem. Its stress on autonomy with 
a corresponding ethic is derived from utilitarian history, and creates people who 
are utterly incapable of living lives which have any narrative coherence. Such lives 
become essentially a response to constant impulses worked out by our autonomous 
consciousnesses, a string of events which cannot be tied to any overreaching me-
aning making individual life understandable to itself. 
We have a situation reminiscent of decadent ancient Rome. There were so 
many gods that, as Chesterton observed, it was impossible to live without offen-
ding at least some of them, which resulted, one might add, with the sight of exi-
stential despair and reversion to the immediate sensual and utterly practical. The 
character of a moral subject, the question of virtue, the content and the structure of 
his desires and dispositions was pushed aside, became peripheral, ceased to stand 
at the center of moral philosophy. Moral philosophers from Socrates to even Hume 
had this issue at the center of their thinking, which meant that this question of cha-
racter formation constituted the most important educational postulate, whether at 
an individual or communal level. But it was the hope never to be fulfilled, a wishful 
thinking of the modern mind. Character could not be properly shaped because the 
very criteria of rational distinction were deemed irrelevant, a problem Kant wanted 
to rectify but failed to. 
As a consequence, character was replaced by the most modern of modern 
words in all walks of life, choice. It appeared that a proper moral choice understood 
by Kant or Reid as deciding between desire and the requirements of morality was 
still thought to be possible, since for Kant objective morality was not only possible 
to be constructed out of rational thinking, but somehow reproduced at the social, 
communal level.12 In the 20th century choice, as for instance in Sartre, was defined 
as a condition of sheer authenticity. It was authenticity, in popular parlance self-
realization, which was to make character in moral philosophy, let alone at mass-
culture level, an obsolete, anachronistic idea. As such choice began to replace cha-
racter formation in public education, the latter being the very essence of education 
since Aristotle. The ideology of New Tolerance was the natural outcome of such 
11 H. C. Mans f i e ld, Pride and Justice in Affirmative Action, [in:] America’s Constitutional Soul, 
Baltimore 1991, p. 95–97.
12 S. Haue rwas, The Virtues of Alasdair MacIntyre, “First Things”, October 2007, p. 36–37.
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a philosophical change. A corresponding blurring of the contours of human rights, 
the new “religion” of liberal modernity, was another outcome. Since human rights 
are decoupled from any ontological basis, and such is the consequence of moder-
nity and its moral doctrine of choice, the idea of human rights is beginning to be 
simply tantamount to individual choice. The enlargement of the list of human rights 
indefinitely is its consequence.13 This replacement of character in moral formation 
by moral choice, or to put it bluntly moral freedom, is the end station of modern 
liberalism.
It is in response to this critical time, a peculiar form of modernity today descri-
bed as liberalism, increasingly unable to provide any means of comprehending the 
meaning of life and human existence, that Mansfield develops his story of the villa-
ins and heroes of modernity. For him liberalism’s descriptions have become totally 
inadequate for humans to be able to act in a manner which would be intelligible to 
others as well as to individuals themselves.14 Mansfield’s direct and indirect critiques 
of liberalism have been as consistent as heretical and gained him the status of gadfly 
at his alma mater, Harvard University. But his perseverance and courage in the face 
of the “herd instinct of the independent minds” stem from a conviction that human 
life, enabling a cultivation of virtues necessary for community and solidarity forma-
tion, the values of which Western civilization is allegedly proud and constitutes its 
perfect embodiment, can be lived only when those who are engaged in constructing 
and engaging in community formation are focused on goods without which such an 
endeavor is futile. Thus such a big role for the right of consent as a mechanism of 
morality formed from bottom up. 
Liberalism as a doctrine and its modern practical embodiment reached such 
a stage where an axiom that there is an ultimate human good towards which humans 
should strive is decisively rejected. It denies any place for a determinative concep-
tion of the human good in public discourse and that any model of a common life 
should be grounded in it. Intellectually this is nothing new: such was the modern 
liberal project as devised already by Machiavelli, Hobbes or Locke. What is new is 
the growing disillusion that this methodological, epistemological and ontological 
stance might form a community of mutual obligations, sustained by other means 
than the minute rules of the administrative state.
Despite this disillusion, liberalism persists in claiming that this is the right 
foundational assumption and course of action. 
This is visible in all public policy measures, for instance in construing the 
rigid idea of separation of state and church understood as the separation of religion 
from public life or in the so called New Tolerance, becoming the main modern 
13 This was already intimated by some conservative Enlightenment thinkers, like Burke or John Adams. 
See: A. B ryk, Liberalism, Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, [in:] Historia Integra, Toruń 2001, p. 318–325.
14 This was shown by Alasdair Mac In ty r e  in his seminal books: A Short History of Ethics, the most 
important After Virtue and Against the Self-Images of the Age. See also: S. Haue rwas, The Virtues of Alasdair 
MacIntyre...
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liberal ideology. It is also visible in public education, which has been corrupted 
by the very act of turning itself into a tool of accommodation to the liberal public 
policy measures, instead of cultivating human minds and souls, the very core of tra-
ditional liberal arts education with its “Great Books” narrative, an essence also of 
political philosophy. Mansfield has constantly defended “Great Books” education 
and education as a means of getting an insight into things permanent, as a field of 
cultivating one of the paramount intellectual virtues of the university, intellectual 
and moral excellence. For Mansfield contemporary universities, including his own 
Harvard University, have betrayed this tradition, corrupting their mission and tur-
ning out students incapable of finding coherence in their lives as citizens. In the 
most dramatic fashion such policy measures make it a duty of the liberal state to 
deconstruct by law and administrative measures, that is force, all the autonomous 
institutions, like for instance churches or families, so they conform to the liberal’s 
state image of the monistic good, a problem Mansfield definitely recognizes as 
dangerous in the context of his sophisticated analysis of contemporary gender fe-
minism and homosexual movements.15 
This policy comes out of fear that such independent institutions might be so 
impudent that they dare teach definite, foundational morality, based on character 
formation. Government in such a case has a tendency to “attempt perfection by 
overriding prejudice, but when it does so it can develop a self-serving tyrannical 
– or bureaucratic – definition of perfection”.16 This liberal totalitarian impulse gi-
ves rise to a psychological and educational industry financed by the administrative 
state. Its aim is to guard the recalcitrant minds from committing the mistake of not 
being progressive and modern enough, especially to prevent them from commit-
ting the most horrible liberal crime of “non-tolerance”. To be non-tolerant means 
essentially that one is judgmental, that is making moral distinctions and creating 
a hierarchy of moral norms. Of course morality and the virtues stemming from it 
are impossible to be attained in any other way. But such a process is immediately 
branded as “exclusive” and “discriminating” and by ideological manipulation tied 
into its alleged consequence of igniting violence and civil war. Contemporary cul-
ture wars dividing the liberal societies defy such liberal monistic pretences.
Mansfield is perceptive enough and, like his great contemporaries Charles 
Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, as a conservative he realizes that, as Nietzsche said, 
“we burned our ships”, and there is no past which we might return to as societies, 
not at least in the foreseeable future. What we have is self-government which mi-
ght, we trust, use reasoned argument in search of what is natural, not just passing. 
He understands that we are all inhabitants of advanced modernity, bearing its social 
and cultural marks, and he is aware that his understanding of the tradition of politi-
cal philosophy and of virtues they teach might be possible on this side of moderni-
ty. He nevertheless takes on the monistic pretensions of modern liberalism in all its 
15 H. C. Mans f i e ld, Manliness, New Haven 2006.
16 I dem, Pride and Justice in Affirmative Action..., p. 97.
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shades, from the standpoint of a different tradition, the classical one. He begins not 
with an autonomous “self” as a source of moral autocreation but with the eternal 
Plato and Aristotle and all the greats after him, including Christian tradition. That is 
those who begin with a simple, commonsensical, in fact, thought, that our actions 
require: first a conception of an end, and second the social and political conditions 
necessary to sustain a life formed by virtues constitutive of that end.17 It is a great 
contribution of Mansfield to show, in different ways and in different fields that such 
a condition is lacking in modern liberal moral practice and theory.
Mansfield tries to ply his trade of political philosophy as a tale of a coherent 
unity, a narration within which an individual life can acquire attributes and capacity 
to attain good. This is possible only when a proper foundation is found. In the hu-
man case this foundation is human nature, empowering a person with elementary 
skills for further growth. The goal of development, once such a foundation has 
been established, is to strive for the good defined by the rules of natural law deri-
ved from the foundation of human nature. Mansfield instinctually refused to grant 
modernity the last word on morality. Although we are autonomous in modernity, 
this autonomy, Mansfield seems to think, operates nevertheless under the influence 
of principles that do not originate from it.18 
These principles can be destroyed, and with them the potential for virtues, 
growth and meaning. The real question is how to recognize the principles of natural 
law, which is obviously impossible for the average human to grasp without falling 
back upon the good practices through which virtue is acquired. Virtue as a capacity 
of mind that allows a recognition of relative goods and the use of skills to attain 
them needs cultivating. Virtues may develop properly only in individual commu-
nities with set traditions. 
For Mansfield, therefore, the notion of a community is paramount. This is 
a generic term, also including a constitutional community. This recognition of de-
pendence on community is, for him, the key to independence and first of all to 
solidarity. The paramount importance of community allows individuals to exercise 
capacities offered by their nature to full potential. This and only this is the way to 
achieve meaning and to reconcile oneself with the world and the others. In this 
sense Mansfield’s powerful presence at Harvard, one of the preeminent American 
liberal arts colleges, has been making a real difference, which has been grudgin-
gly recognized even by his opponents.19 If the real issue in the 1960s, as James Q. 
Wilson remarked, “was what one must do to save the University”, then Mansfield 
has done here an outstanding service to save the university, not only in the sense of 
preserving standards but also in the sense of treating it as a place where young im-
17 S. Haue rwas, The Virtues of Alasdair MacIntyre...
18 As a student of Strauss, Mansfield would probably feel good with such an exchange between Strauss 
and one of his students. “But Mr. Strauss. Aren’t we Moderns? Yes, replied Strauss, but we are not merely Mod-
erns”, quoted in: D. Mur r ay, Neoconservatism, New York 2006, p. 12.
19 J. Ta s se l, “Harvard Magazine”, September–October 1999, p. 56–66.
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pressionable minds should be exposed to the things “permanent”, things elevating, 
things remembered in life which was to be always striving, in the best tradition of 
John Henry Newman and Benedict Arnold.20
Machiavelli and America
In his books The Spirit of Liberalism (1978) and America’s Constitutional Soul 
(1991) as well as in Taming the Prince (1989), a work on philosophical origins of 
executive power, Mansfield shows that the strength of the American political order 
lies in its carefully and intelligently designed “constitutional soul”. What he means 
by this is an idea that the politicians who created the Constitution of 1787 rejected 
the Machiavellian ambition to dispense with classical virtue altogether, and did 
not focus solely on self-interest, economic interest and rights, features commonly 
associated with the American, Lockean type of liberalism. 
But if Machiavelli was a modern man, and America is modern, how come Ame-
rica is not Machiavellian? For Mansfield Machiavelli is the most articulate exponent 
of modernity as applied to politics. In his books Machiavelli’s New Modes and Or-
ders: A Study of the Discourses on Livy (1979) and the deeply original and influential 
collection of essays Machiavelli’s Virtue (1996) Mansfield follows his teacher Leo 
Strauss, emphasizing Machiavelli’s thought as the first and self-conscious “founder” of 
a distinctively modern political and philosophical sensibility. Thus it is necessary 
to define first the modern problem as seen by Machiavelli, since for Mansfield, as 
for Strauss, a recovery of virtue in the conditions of modern freedom has to start 
with Machiavelli’s diagnosis and practical solutions. His world is our world, our 
modernity, and we have to start from it if we are to engage in a meaningful and 
reasonable search for virtue in modernity of late liberalism, to which pressures the 
American constitutional system is increasingly subjected. 
For Strauss, Machiavelli rejected the pre-modern classical tradition as exem-
plified by the ancient and Christian sense of virtuous life as a goal of political order. 
In other words Machiavelli recast virtue in its application to politics, or executed 
a radical intellectual break in the understanding of morality in public life. This tra-
dition against which Machiavelli revolted – and this was a premeditated and cold 
rebellion – was characterized by certain beliefs and moral goals. There was no di-
stinction in this tradition between morality and politics. This distinction was made 
by Machiavelli, who taught at the same time to take a posture of detachment or, 
better to say, moral indifference, in the presence of vice. Vice was more a technical 
problem, not a moral problem, for a political order. Thus a wise ruler had to learn 
how not to be virtuous in the first place, since the major aim of his governance is 
preservation of order and survival. Among these classical ideas against which Ma-
chiavelli revolted was the idea that political philosophy was to be understood as an 
20 Quotation in: ibidem, p. 59.
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incessant quest for the best political order, the order which was most conducive to 
the cultivation of virtue, and in which each person gets its due and occupies its pro-
per, that is rightful place according to his or her nature. This search for virtue was 
thus, by its very essence, hierarchical, distinguishing higher and lower orders of 
existence in the political realm. To use the modern language, this search for virtue 
was highly judgmental, non-tolerant and discriminatory for the sake of elevating 
people above their beastly impulses. Creation of a political order best suited for 
a cultivation of the virtuous people was the main goal of politicians and political 
philosophers.21
This classical as well as Christian political philosophy recognized of course 
an element of chance, since it was unfortunately highly unlikely that the condi-
tions which the political philosophers could recognize as conducive to virtue could 
persuade politicians, albeit such a situation could not be entirely excluded. But 
the most important classical theme was this idea that nature, in this human nature, 
dictates the proper limits of conduct on humans. They cannot overcome their na-
ture. If they try, the consequences for them and for a political order itself would be 
calamitous. The Greeks named this desire hybris, the Christians the sin of conceit. 
This urge was recognized as a deadly sin which, once committed, would result, 
sooner or later, in the total corruption of a polity and of an individual soul, leading 
to despair and anomie.22 
Machiavelli consciously rejected these assumptions, first of all subverting 
the very idea of nature. Nature was just a pure speculative obstacle to clear-cut thin-
king. For Machiavelli it constituted a nonhuman standard. Its efficacy and utility 
for human aspirations was none. Machiavelli lowered the goals of political philo-
sophy and human society, beginning with humans as he found them, rather than as 
they should be, and declared that the political leaders were to take care of the basic 
human needs as they were, rather than their highest aspirations. With that, a role of 
political philosophers, in fact the role of speculative, abstract reason as such in se-
arch of an ideal, higher order, had to be altered. No longer blazing intellectual trails, 
philosophers and theologians were reduced from the position of leaders of society. 
Their place was taken by the prince, the state. The former were reduced to the role 
of pure advisers. Not reason but power, at best contained and tamed, was now to be 
the pinnacle around which the very life of the polis was to revolve, possibly in the 
best interests of the basic needs of the society. 
As a consequence, chance, the ancient Fortuna, was also to be drastically 
eliminated. Humans were sovereign, they make their own chances, leaders in turn 
have full control of their destinies and the destinies of the people they lead. As 
long as they devote their efforts to meeting the objects of their subjects’ immediate 
21 Ar i s t o t l e, Nicomachean Ethics, [in:] The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. J. Ba rnes, Princeton 
1984, book I, p. 1743, book II, p. 1103–1104.
22 T. V. McAl l i s t e r, Revolt Against Modernity: Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin and the Search for a Post-
liberal Order, Lawrence 1995, p. 31.
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desires, instead of leading them toward some higher good, the political order can 
be stable and felicitous. Machiavelli was the first modern, because he reduced the 
reach of political philosophy. It became simply not a quest for the good order or the 
natural, but just the technical problem of achieving a political order best suited to 
satisfy the basic human desires. But in the course of satisfying such desires, nature 
became an object of manipulation and understanding, so as to conform to human 
need, which had essentially human will as its principal source. Nature became un-
derstood as an object of scientific study, which in turn meant that science itself was 
focused solely on nature being used for immediate human needs. That is science 
treated nature as an obstacle, ready to remove limitations from it. Teleological, and 
by implication also theological understanding of nature grew increasingly obsolete, 
redundant. Soon, for Francis Bacon, a couple of generations after Machiavelli, and 
the subsequent Enlightenment thinkers, science became the main mover behind 
human endeavors. They turned out to be ultimately rooted in the capricious human 
will. This Machiavellian as well as scientific revolution began to control, that is to 
transform nature.23
In addition to such a treatment of nature, Machiavelli changed a meaning of 
political philosophy. Mansfield dissects the contours of this Machiavellian break-
through of modernity with a clear understanding that with Machiavelli – and here 
he follows the footsteps of Strauss – politics began inexorably to follow the path 
towards gangsterism, the so-called modern “political realism”. For Mansfield, Ma-
chiavelli recast the meaning of virtue, but he could not do this without at the same 
time recasting the meaning of morality itself and that without radically changing 
the ends, that is purposes of political life. This recasting of the classical and for 
this instance Christian idea of virtue is the key to Mansfield’s dissection of Ma-
chiavelli, since he understands that what was and is in fact at stake was a question 
of modernity’s regression of politics into a province of immoral conduct, not as 
a fact but as a normative ideal. For Machiavelli, in Mansfield’s interpretation, vir-
tue ceased to mean the province of moral lasting norms but began to mean simply 
flexibility, cunningness according to the times or situations. What began to count 
for a politician was the utility of power to produce a result, without being inhibited 
by any moral constraints. That is to be efficient, with the objectives coming from 
the logic of power play itself. 
Mansfield made an incisive observation that Machiavelli executed an ope-
ration which made distinctions between different regimes meaningless, differences 
which were regarded until his time as deciding whether a particular regime was 
23 Literature on this shift of paradigm between the ancients and the moderns is voluminous. See for instance 
a classical exposition of this conflict in the works of Leo S t r aus s, for instance Natural Rights and History, also his 
chapters on Plato, Machiavelli as well as Nathan Tarcov’s and Thomas L. Pang l e ’s chapter Leo Strauss and the 
History of Political Philosophy, [in:] History of Political Philosophy, ed. L. S t r aus s, J. C ropsey, Chicago 1987, 
p. 33–89, 296–317, 907–936. This Machiavelli’s breakthrough and its consequences are well exposed in T. V. A l -
l i s t e r, Revolt Against Modernity..., chapter 1, as well as in P. Manen t, The City of Man, Princeton 1998, esp. 
p. 156–182; also L. M. F r i edman, A Republic of Choice, Cambridge Mass. 1996.
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good or bad. This became so because “the ruling part is always the same, and only 
the relation of princes to each other and of princes to the people discloses the nature 
of the regime”. A regime of “consent” would satisfy their deepest concern, the con-
cern for security and their fear of being governed. Thus a government ruling in the 
name of the people will be able to convince people to accept much more easily the 
hardships of being governed. But the forms of the regimes do not matter much, since 
“regardless of the forms, government will always be in the hands of a few, who will 
always be in effect ‘princes’, no matter how they are styled. And even a government 
republican in form may gratify the ‘humors’ of those who rule – namely the passion 
for glory, fame, or – as we say in tamer times – ‘recognition’. Machiavelli understo-
od that even a republic would need to be renewed, to be shaken occasionally from its 
settled conventions, and the instrument of rejuvenation he would find in ‘sensational 
executions’. To rule was to ‘execute’ with ‘effect’ – not only to produce the desired 
result, but to make an impression on the public mind. It also meant to execute in the 
sense of punishing, and punishment, too, had its utility. For it could at once plant 
fear and assuage anger”.24
Here Mansfield recovered from Machiavelli’s thought the most striking 
practical observation which is directly applied to a contemporary world, that is the 
nature of modern executive power. A contemporary myth has it that to “execute” 
a policy means to carry the will of the people, or to carry out the mandates of the 
constitution itself. But Machiavelli was the first modern, and Mansfield recovered 
this idea perfectly, showing that the law is a very imperfect document, that by na-
ture it could not attain what it attempts, since the law speaks in universal terms and 
thus needs assistance from outside to decide what was reasonable in each case. 
Mansfield showed this modern brilliance of Machiavelli in its full exposure, that 
in the hand of a “good prince” the reality of government means simply ruling with 
the fictions of the law. In the contemporary world this “execution of laws” depends 
also increasingly on the interpretative powers of constitutional tribunals or courts 
in general. Both the executive and the courts in modernity go in fact hand in hand 
in forming a ruling class, “the modern prince”, constituting the essence of the regi-
me’s decision process, in the name of the people, but in fact doing what they want 
to get and bending laws to their ends. That was partially an insight of “Brutus” 
commenting on the proclivities of the American new federal constitution to form an 
alliance between the executive, the judiciary and Congress, ruling in the name of 
the people, but in fact for the interests of the governing elite, something he termed 
a “coterminous power theory” of federal governance, where the separation of po-
wers and checks and balances would be obliterated by a skillful interpretation of the 
law of the Constitution by the Super Court.25
24 H. Arkes, reviewing Mans f i e ld’s Taming the Prince in Recasting Virtue, “New Criterion”, Sep-
tember 1996, p. 124–125.
25 See on that: A. B ryk, The United States Constitution in the Thought of the Antifederalist’s ‘Bru-
tus’: The Nature of the Compact, the Concept of Representation and the Consolidation Theory”, [in:] Szkice z 
dziejów ustroju i prawa, Krakow 1997, p. 61–75.
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Mansfield showed deftly how this factual state of affairs had to be concealed 
by the ruling class since “the assent of the multitude could not be gained so readily 
for a regime that made so brutally clear that it rested on the splendor of uno solo, of 
one man or a gifted few, acting out their passion to rule”.26 But this governing clas-
s’s will to have its way, justified by the lip service of the “people’s rule” formula, 
has a powerful ally, increasing the power of this governing elite. It is the modern 
concept of the “reason of the state”, a faint, even if a much more powerful echo 
of the ancient requirement of “self defense”. It is this increasing danger of the real 
threats from abroad and within the state, for instance terrorism, which may make 
more urgent the unconstrained hand of the Executive, or wider, the ruling elite, 
justified by the security and wellbeing of the people themselves.
Mansfield showed how Machiavelli’s cold realism of this new science of 
politics totally decoupled a moral reasoning from the province of power as such, 
something which was visible in the striking absence of any mention in his writings 
of the “soul”, anima. Politics thus became in Machiavelli a here-and-now affair of 
immediate animal passions of humans rationally organized and executed, with the 
total extinction of a moral dimension towards which political life might be, however 
tenuously, directed. By doing this, claims Mansfield, Machiavelli repudiated the 
whole corpus of human thought, nay, culture as such, understanding the latter as 
a simple utilitarian device to make animal passions of humans more manageable. 
The greatest traditions of the classics, Christianity and Judaism were cast aside as 
useless devices which tried fruitlessly to orient humans towards moral goals higher 
than their immediate desires, devising policies which would make these desires ta-
med and geared towards virtues which would attempt to make the humans better 
than they themselves were. But Machiavelli defined such attempts as misguided, not 
only futile but erroneous. Politics is about power per se, and no morality can do any-
thing about this. It is a virtual entity together with the fictions of the Constitution and 
the restrains of the laws, justifying in the eyes of the gullible people the inexorable 
logic of the unrestrained power of the executive, aided by the modern judiciary, to 
execute policies shaping the world according to their own image of them.
Machiavelli thus opened the gates to all kinds of ideologies which purport to 
make human beings inhabit a more just and equal world despite the natural order 
of things. In other words Machiavelli in fact killed the notion of the nature of man, 
and with this the concept of natural law as an immutable order of things, off limits 
to certain political experiments. Lessons from this change were eventually drawn 
by Thomas Hobbes, and later John Locke, who elevated the lowest desires of hu-
man will to a level of legitimate desires as the highest political goal. The natural, 
objective, rooted in ontology right, turned into individual right, at the beginning the 
right to self-preservation, and then rights of people as members of a state, to relieve 
humans from some burdens. This was a task which John Locke completed, and it 
became the ultimate justification and a source of liberal democracy.27
26 H. Arkes, Recasting Virtue...., p. 126.
27 See on that also L. S t r aus s, Natural Right in History...
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Modern Liberalism and Constitutional Government 
Here is where Mansfield takes up the gauntlet of modern liberalism and with it 
modern constitutionalism. If he is a liberal this happens to be for two reasons. One 
is reluctance of being in constant rebellion against the reigning spirit of one’s own 
age, the rebellion which may yield little immediate gain, begetting instead just an 
empty frustration, and causing a clouding of sharp thinking, and thus an ability to 
analyze ways of escaping such liberalism. Here Mansfield is definitely more in the 
tradition of modernity’s critique of his beloved Tocqueville than Chateaubriand, 
let alone de Maistre. That Tocqueville who knew that understanding rather than 
impotent rebellion is necessary for the wisdom of saving what is there to save for 
the future. Second, because after Strauss Mansfield thinks that after all liberalism is 
the best regime for our time. Nevertheless, liberalism is a political ideology borne 
out of a modernist impulse, pretending to be the philosophical stone of politics for 
ages to come. 
Constitutionalism is a child of liberalism, and it is here that this feud of Mans-
field with contemporary liberals seem to be especially poignant. For Mansfield Ma-
chiavelli was the author of modern constitutional executive as a decisive part of 
modern constitutional order, and despite the denials of contemporary liberals Ma-
chiavellism and modern constitutionalism are twin brothers, being a consequence of 
the same ontological and anthropological assumptions. In such a perspective consti-
tutionalism is definitely opposed to Machiavellism, but not entirely so. Machiavelli 
disdained the constitutional forms which constitutionalism enshrines, being at the 
same time a direct means of thwarting criminality in politics. Constitutionalism de-
finitely rejects Machiavelli’s shameless idea that the truth of an act is revealed in its 
effect, in how it turns out rather than how it was done. In other words constitutiona-
lism definitely does not accept the premise that the end justifies the means. But there 
is a problem with selfishness as an operating principle of action both in Machiavelli 
and in modern liberal constitutionalism. 
Liberalism, according to Mansfield, did not begin on its own, independently 
of Machiavelli, as liberals like to claim or was filtered through Machiavelli’s tho-
ught, taking his lessons on a subject of hard political necessity, but then deriving 
opposite conclusions from him. There is no doubt for Mansfield that liberalism did 
not have an innocent birth, that it was born out of an “original sin”, that is a total 
metaphysical rebellion which left Cain’s stigma on liberalism’s conscience, at the 
same time pretending that such a crime did not occur. This metaphysical rebellion 
which Machiavelli declared as a starting point of contemporary politics and liberal 
constitutionalism took for granted hiding its anthropological as well as ontologi-
cal assumptions, was a colossal act of substitution of man for God, or to put it in 
other words, a replacement of the immutable moral order of nature by a moral 
autocreation of a liberated individual. This change was so radical that some of the 
most perceptive critics of modernity, such as Kant or Dostoyevsky, defined it as the 
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“to be or not to be” of humanity. They asked a question what were the sources of 
morality as such which individuals were to listen to, and why they should listen to 
morality which increasingly began to be defined as a subjective will of happiness 
understood as a fulfillment of an immediate desire, contravening all established 
morality as such.
Liberalism, thinks Mansfield, avoided this problem, or hid it deeply under 
the pretence of creating morality out of the mutual consent of rational individuals. 
But Mansfield destroys this senseless self-contentment of liberalism, showing that 
as a doctrine of individualism it was at the same time a powerful demolishing tool 
of the hitherto known culture based on a distinctive anthropology and ontology. In 
other words that liberalism was a colossal act of violence which was to produce an 
individual as a basic, operating agent in a society, in the first place. Hobbes and Loc-
ke, the founders of liberalism, arrived at this position via the construction of a state 
of nature. For them an individual exists in the state of nature, either in a state of war 
as Hobbes claimed, or of great inconvenience as Locke assumed. This state of nature 
compels an individual, they thought, to look to himself, and excuses whatever irre-
gularities may be necessary in that state. Contemporary liberals do not talk, or talk 
in a sanitized way, about the state of nature, preferring to use the idea of “original 
position”, in which rational individuals somehow decide to be compassionate libe-
rals towards humanity as such, in abstracto, but via the welfare state, in connection 
with each particular human being. 
But for Mansfield it is obvious that such a rosy view of liberalism and consti-
tutionalism is a myth because the individual
in whom we put our faith required a wrenching effort to become realized. The ‘perfectly 
free’ individual of whom Locke speaks had to free himself, or be freed by Locke, of the obligations 
that tie man to God. To break these ties is a decision more active than a mere parting of the ways, 
as in an uncontested divorce. For the liberal principle of mutual consent cannot be established by 
consent: one must first show why consent is reasonable and necessary. Why am I not my brothe-
r’s keeper, as the Bible says I must be, regardless of consent? To answer this question one must 
venture profanely into sacred precincts and declare them subject to human necessities and human 
sovereignty, as Machiavelli did when he excused Romulus’s fratricide as necessary to make himself 
uno solo. With his demonstration of the daring it takes to make oneself truly alone, Machiavelli 
unsheathes the original liberal individual. The original individual is a tyrant, and necessarily so, 
because the selfishness used to defend himself against God carries over to relations with his fellow 
human beings, [here] Machiavelli reverses the reasoning of the Bible. With his sensational strokes 
of execution, the prince is the original empowered individual. To ignore the Machiavellian origin 
of the liberal individual is to deny the need for taming in constitutional government. If power is not 
essentially encroaching, why does it need to be limited? One also forgets the connection between 
necessity and virtue, stressed by Machiavelli and accepted by the liberal philosophers. Will our 
rights be well-exercised and offices in government be well-executed if no pressure is brought to 
bear? The harm to liberalism from ignoring Machiavelli comes by these avenues of complacency.28
28 H. C. Mans f i e ld, Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power, Baltimore 
2005, p. XVI–XVII.
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Another argument Mansfield has which contemporary liberalism and con-
stitutionalism, is Mansfield’s thesis about the modern executive’s ambivalent natu-
re, which cannot be harnessed by the most intricate laws. Here liberalism employs 
its darling child political science, arguing, in the words of its believers, that if the 
ambivalent executive power means vague, untrustworthy or indeterminate, which 
may indeed be a problem, then it is possible to correct this challenge precisely by 
political science, that is proper empirical or other research. Mansfield considers 
this hope as a ludicrous hubris of the liberal mind, in fact a fantasy not meeting 
a challenge of any reasoned argument, including an empirical one, let alone common 
sense observation. If such a possibility of construing a perfect legal and administra-
tive system was possible, than we would have full justification for an absence of 
virtue. There would simply be no need for it, no discussion of it in a democratic repu-
blic, since a perpetuum mobile of this administrative, legal system built into a consti-
tutional structure would ensure the proper behavior both of politicians and citizens. 
This constitutes a fascinating arrogant belief of political science which is 
a mirror image of a liberal sociology, which makes human behavior entirely depen-
dent on society’s organization, thus trying, for instance, to explain the roots of evil 
by non-moral sources of human individual conduct, thus trying to organize society in 
such a way as to relieve men of being good. They have simply to be living in a well 
organized society, eliminating the root causes of evil. Liberalism does not need virtue 
here as an aid to a constitutional scheme since 
in a liberal constitution one can construct offices or institutions that tend toward good ad-
ministration, but there is no guarantee of the virtue required for the effect. Our more scientific 
brethren, dissatisfied with a mere inclination and seeking certainty in results, eliminate the virtue 
that may or may not complete the tendencies of institutions. Virtue is a variable in the true, stubborn 
sense, incapable of being correlated in a system. So, with the best of intentions and seeking to do 
good, the scientists refuse to speak of good. They believe that once values have been eliminated 
from the study of facts, the promise of liberalism to enable us to govern ourselves will at last be ful-
filled – since fulfillment will no longer be subject to change. The scientists caught in this vain hope 
are joined by superdemocrats who dislike virtue because it is aristocratic. The latter want democra-
cy without excellence, which they fear as a source of unaccountable power, all too predictable in its 
harmful effects if not contained. Such a democracy, however, would still need levelers, averages, 
and flatteners, and still reserve offices and prizes for them. If superdemocracy should come – or 
have we not seen it already? – virtue will have received a strange twist, turning on itself, not merely 
to guard against false claims of virtue, the intent of liberalism, but even to try to suppress itself. But 
virtue cannot suppress itself, because the attempt requires virtue. Virtue will always be present in 
human affairs in its undiminished ambivalence, indispensable and undependable.29
What Mansfield does here is not only a defense of virtue and moral life as 
such, but a fundamental defense and hymn to freedom as such, freedom as a con-
dition of human life so rich, so indeterminate, so full of passions, contradictions, 
fists of desire to commit evil as well as commit goodness, that any attempt to make 
29 Ibidem, p. XVIII, see also an exchange between S. S. Wolin and Mansfield in “Studies in American 
Political Development” 1992, vol. 6, p. 211–221.
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it predictable or organized under a pretence of one monistic common denominator 
how a “good” life should look seems to be ridiculous, bordering on utopia pointing 
towards despotism. Mansfield’s is a spirited defense of the freedom of an individu-
al, which is ultimately rooted in the freedom of Someone who made men truly free 
in the first place, because of Himself being a taboo to Machiavelli, political scienti-
sts, or any assorted bunch of people thinking that their particular point in time and 
history is the perfect vantage point to organize a perfect society.
Mansfield treats Machiavelli’s project not only as a subject of merciless in-
tellectual dissection about the sources of modernity. Machiavelli is for him also 
a stepping stone for recovery of the moral grounds of politics. Mansfield does not 
count much on the character of a ruler or an elite to constrain themselves, to re-
spect the law equally. That would require an ingrained religious belief or natural 
law grounded in it; the ingrained ethics of the secular making would not do. But 
religion and natural law have simply ceased today to be an anchor for the character 
of men in politics, let alone cultural elite. If, then, such sources are non-existent, 
since Machiavelli killed the classical or Christian natural law, and as a consequence 
Christian natural right, as irrelevant, if not overtly superstitious, then what would 
constrain such a ruler or the elite from doing what they would like to do? If any 
Constitution is a fiction, the people gullible, the notions of moral truths or natural 
law laughed at, and Christianity all but gone from culture, then what is going to 
guard us against the despotism looming behind such politics? 
Mansfield’s answer is as romantic as it is opaque, but at the same time it 
follows the great tradition of Strauss. Realistic doctrine of virtue has simply to be 
conveyed to students as covert teaching. But what would be the efficacy of it? Here 
Mansfield somehow counters his sober argument about the lack of any moral sour-
ces lying behind the sheer will of power of the ruler and the elite, even if executed 
with the best of their intentions, which are nevertheless their intentions of the best 
possible course of action. If covert teaching might be of any use it is because there 
must be an inner moral kernel of a human being, a moral soul which can resist all 
attempts to obliterate it. It is the role of great teachers to keep this moral soul alive, 
to nourish it and to hope that enough such souls will be saved to carry the human 
race into the post-Machiavellian future.
Mansfield’s appeal is as much a call for a resurrection of a political philo-
sophy as a call for a return to a classical liberal education. The latter was once in 
the liberal-democratic society a basis for meaningful knowledge, and is now being 
buried under this debilitating idea that the aim of education is just utilitarian pre-
paration of young people for a market. Inadvertently, Mansfield is defending here 
a great tradition of the West’s self-understanding, forming a bridge to the university 
of Christianitas and the Academy of the Ancients, kind of a cry in the wilderness. 
This cry is also unfortunately applicable to Harvard University, Mansfield’s alma 
mater and his teaching turf for the last half a century, the first American university. 
Founded in 1636, Harvard has become by many judgments and in the company of 
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other great American universities, despite its brilliant history and the highest market 
utility of its diplomas, an institution deserting this idea for which universities were 
founded. Worryingly, it has begun in its humanities departments to be increasingly 
an epiphany of a useless, porridge-like, ideological and acedic  education to nothin-
gness. Mansfield has become for generations a conscious rebel in this arid land, not 
because he has been an especially pugnacious and revolutionary spirit – one can 
imagine no more kind and gentle person than he is – but because he could do no 
otherwise, because his faithfulness to truth and himself required this as a civil duty.30
Constitutionalism, Virtue and the Culture of Rights
If America is quintessentially a modern nation, it is at the same time a unique mo-
dern nation with an interesting response to all the inherent challenges and dangers 
of modernity to human freedom. Mansfield refuses to grant Machiavelli the last 
word on the American constitutional system. Although America is a modern so-
ciety, it was also built on the clear understanding that for this type of society to 
survive real virtues have to be developed, inculcated and defended. But virtue in 
the American constitutional system is not and cannot be directly inculcated. How 
could it be when 
society dedicated to liberty could [not] make much of virtue [since the one] resolved to have 
virtue could [not] pride itself on liberty. Yet liberty and virtue also seem necessary to each other. 
A free people, with greater opportunity to misbehave than a people in shackles, needs the guidance 
of an inner force to replace the lack of external restraint. And [since] virtue cannot come from wi-
thin, or truly be virtue, unless it is voluntary and people are free to choose it, whence does it come? 
Americans are, and think themselves to be, a free people first of all. Whatever virtue they have, and 
how much of it, is a counterpoint to the theme of liberty. But how do they manage to make virtue 
and liberty harmonious?31
Mansfield tries to answer this fundamental question of American moder-
nity and constitutional system, a tension between freedom and virtue, through an 
extensive review of the different approaches to it taken up by John Locke, Charles 
de Montesquieu, Benjamin Franklin and finally the Federalist Papers, the original 
commentary on the Constitution of 1787. Freedom understood in a modern sense 
is essentially unrestrained. It is a will-obsessed impulse. Virtue is on the other hand 
a force of guided restraint, guided in a condition when guidance is increasingly 
being derived essentially from the sheer will of an autonomous self and its moral 
autocreation. Where in such a situation, asks Mansfield, can we thus find a semblan-
30 On this problem see: J. Ha r t, Smiling through a Cultural Catastrophe, Wilmington 2004; on Mans-
field’s and other academics’, both liberal and conservative, cultural battles at Harvard University against dimin-
ishing humanistic education see J. Tas se l, Thirty Years’ War...
31 H. C. Mans f i e ld, Liberty and Virtue in the American Founding, “Krakowskie Studia Między-
narodowe” 2008, No. 1, p. 91.
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ce of virtue in the American constitutional system? For Mansfield the only source 
of virtue is the very construction of the system itself. Ultimately it is not Locke’s
self-interest generally or theoretically understood, but the interest of the office… through 
which ambition, energy, and responsibility [shines]… The interest of the office is a kind of interest 
that permits and requires the cooperation of virtue. The lesson overall is that moral philosophy is 
incomplete without political philosophy.32
If so, Mansfield seems to suggest, then political philosophy understood as 
wisdom gained out of the constitutional experience of free people may lead us into 
gaining an insight into things permanent, kind of a déjà vu for a modern philoso-
pher. It is political philosophy again which might lure us into turning around our 
lives onto a path of searching for truth. This would be done voluntarily and with the 
full understanding that this choice is free, although it brings happy rewards.
Mansfield’s oeuvre is also shot through with perceptive observations about 
how the modern culture of rights destroys self-government and constitutionalism. 
He is, in the context of American constitutionalism, a critic of transforming consti-
tutional rights into human rights trumping the former. Human rights, increasingly 
lacking a firm ontological and anthropological basis, incessantly expand. The sole 
justification of such an expansion becomes a wish of the autonomous self, put forth 
as a demand for more equality in all spheres of life. In this new version 
we have seen, rights are no longer ‘civil’ as distinguished from and related to natural rights. 
They are human rights and as such have no necessary relationship to civil society, the Constitution, 
or the common good. In our own day they are also known ‘entitlements’, originally a technical term 
for claims on a budget that must be paid out regardless of how many claim them. When rights in 
general are taken as entitlements, even the sky is not the limit, and your rights culminate, not in the 
right of consent, but in your right to feel dissatisfied. One could sum up entitlements in this manner: 
they have no reference to the common good; they result from no actual or potential contribution by 
the entitled; they do not have to be individually, much less responsibly, exercised; and they deny 
past progress in rights while producing a static society of defensive special interests.33
Mansfield looks at contemporary rights understood as entitlements as a re-
sult of a tectonic change in the very concept of rights in modernity, which ceased 
to be subjected to a structural ordering of a constitutional state operating through 
a right of consent. This right of consent is both natural and civil, lying between na-
tural and civil rights. It is natural, shows Mansfield, since it is prior to civil rights. 
It is civil insofar as it is through consent that conventional, limited civil rights are 
established, including here the right to vote, which is a civil version of the right of 
consent. Consent is crucial because it creates government; at the same time it is se-
curity which tells government that although rights are secured by government, they 
32 Ibidem, p. 106–107.
33 H. C. Mans f i e ld, The Revival of Constitutionalism, [in:] The Revival of Constitutionalism, ed. J. W. 
Mul l e r, Lincoln–London 1988, p. 222.
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were not created by government and do not exist at the convenience of government. 
They are in fact natural, of which the consent is the conscious guarantee of them 
being orderly implemented through government. 
What is crucial here is that rights must be understood as being accompanied 
by a form of government because only the government, its constitutional form, can 
guarantee them. That form simply secures rights by governing under law, and this 
rule is exercised by the majority which is constitutional, as opposed to a factious 
majority. This situation is not tantamount to the tyranny of the majority. Consti-
tutional government operates by the majority rule, but this majority is never the 
same. The right of consent is the right absorbing in time a democratic discussion 
and giving minorities a stake and security in such a constitutional state. If the mi-
norities want to challenge that mechanism, they argue from a right going against 
the constitutional structure, and they have an obligation also to provide reasons 
why their rights are not sheer entitlements. In other words they have to subject their 
conception of rights to a reasoned argument in public and not to push for their full 
realization in public, in every sphere of life, to push for their conception of a poli-
tical order and culture solely for themselves.
There is a tendency here to argue from first principles, which in modernity, 
decoupled from any fundamental justification of rights grounded in any common 
anthropology and ontology, are very often tantamount to the subjective wishes of 
an autonomous self. This subverts constitutionalism which is also subject to outside 
pressures, especially contemporary social sciences. It is social science today which
refuses to tolerate the indeterminacy of a situation in which the Constitution may or may not 
achieve its end. Social science wants a guarantee of the result. To get this guarantee, it will conceive 
the problem differently. It is much friendlier, for example, to the checking function of the separation 
of powers than to its tendency to produce good administration because the checking function relies 
on self-interest rather than virtue, and of course self-interest is more reliable than virtue. That is 
self-interest is more predictable than virtue, not more responsible. To get determinate results social 
science favors predictability over responsibility in the description of constitutional government. But 
it is in the nature of a form to leave open the content or behavior which it formalizes; hence it is in 
the nature of a constitutional form to describe or embody, without describing a function that may or 
may not be performed. The insistence of social science on determinate, predictable results requires 
to look through or overlook constitutional forms to uncover what it regards as the actual behavior 
behind those forms… Social science does not accept the distinction essential to the Federalist be-
tween the people’s will and their reason or intention. It takes note that we have no assurance from 
the working of the Constitution that popular will become a reasoned intention. An aptitude to refine 
the people’s will or a tendency in that direction is not enough, since the Constitution must do what 
it does without fail and without dispute. Therefore, instead of studying promised tendencies in the 
Constitution of its asserted functions, which are frequently not delivered in fact, social science turns 
to search for the determinants of popular will…In order to achieve the determinacy of a science that 
is universal, necessary, and exact, social science looks beneath popular will rather than beyond it. 
For what determines or correlates with popular will cannot be will.34 
[...] The social science disregards the people’s will, considering it as a problem, whereas the 
Federalist elevates it to an quiding intention. Once you try to understand the people’s will, you must 
34 Ibidem, p. 223–224.
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apply rational criteria of your own maleing, meaning you must disregard that will and be led above 
or below it. Social science, as a kind of positivist science looks below, to find out why people will as 
they do, because of their income, sex, race, locality, and other determining, possible to be measured 
criteria of social science. The majority of social scientists agree that constitutional checks on popular 
will are necessary. Such checks are based on a calculation of self-interest, a more determinate and 
predictable motive than virtue. But they are unable to say why they approve of them. As a consequ-
ence, their theories bellie, in fact, their sense of responsibility and their political judgment, and issue 
in a certain democratism, which is the result of seeking determinacy. Social scientists see that the 
forms of the Constitution do not surely elevate popular will, as intended; they believe their analyses 
show that only certain fortunate minorities are surely elevated by these forms, for example, property 
holders. The consequence of social science is to debunk these groups as ‘elites’. When social science 
rejects the explanatory value of the constitutional in favor of the extraconstitutional, it necessarily 
denies the political contribution of those who claim to use the constitutional forms as intended… The 
democratism of social science is a strange one, however, because it discloses a democracy without 
a people-that is, a democracy in which the people are not a whole. The people could be a whole only 
if their will were a whole, if it could be understood as an intention with a common good. But since 
there is no guarantee of this, social science seeks indeterminants of popular will, as we have seen. 
But in seeking those determinants, social science dissolves the people’s will into wills. Different 
groups in the people have wills that are determined differently. Since there is no determinate com-
mon good, one cannot speak of ‘the people’; even a ‘majority’ is made up of not for good or ill, as in 
Federalist No.10, but arbitrarily. All democratic politics come as bargaining, every democratic ma-
jority is nothing but ‘a coalition’. But if this is the case, minorities or elites must necessarily prevail 
in democracy. Partisanship for democracy turns out to be merely partisanship for the groups that the 
social scientist happens to prefer within democracy.35
There is, Mansfield suggests, a great impatience with such constitutionalism, 
and a dangerous one at that. It brings social science as a superior tool of determining 
the goals of the community, and as a consequence tries to bring executive power 
to act against the people’s expression of immediate, constitutional will in allegedly 
their best interests executed by the elites. But such a stance usually views a defini-
tion of people’s interests as commensurate with the interests of the elites, who know 
best what ordinary people want. This constitutes a paternalistic, disdainful attitude 
towards those who do not want to recognize such elites as having a better insight 
into the political and existential, in fact, matters, as being, in wit, wiser. This conflict 
creates a silent resistance of the society at large, which thinks that there is a hidden 
alliance between elites, in this contemporary case, mainly liberal-left elites and mi-
norities which act against their concept of life, their freedom. On the other hand it 
causes impatience and a revolt of the elites against their own societies. 
Such a revolt of the elites against their own traditional societies has been 
inherent in the European liberal culture at least since the French Revolution of 1789, 
and has become a permanent feature of the Enlightenment mind so well described 
by Goethe in Faust. But it got a radical boost in the wake of the 1968 countercul-
tural revolution which made such ideas as “liberation” from any authority, as well 
as “the private is political”, geared to the new anthropology of autonomous self as 
a sovereign source of moral judgment its sine qua non condition of legitimate society. 
35 Ibidem, p. 224–225.
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Such a revolt of the elites against the masses in America was essentially a much later 
phenomenon and has met with much stronger resistance of the American people for 
reasons of them being better organized, less dependent on the welfare state, finan-
cially more abundant and ready to challenge such tendencies from bottom up by 
a process of self-organization. Nevertheless such a revolt began clearly at the turn of 
the 20th century with progressive liberalism, psychotherapy as a new science of ad-
justment to the progressive society, and last but not least the split within Protestant 
Christianity into a fundamentalist and progressive, social gospel wings, the latter 
increasingly playing the role of justifying the various liberal progressive actions of 
the elites against recalcitrant society.36
For Mansfield the best protection of rights in the U.S. Constitution was, in 
general, the principle embodied in the very text of the Constitution as written in 
1787, before the Bill of Rights was added. In other words the best way to protect 
rights was through proper institutions.37 The Bill of Rights had a potential of going 
beyond that principle and in fact changed the terms of the debate, even if what 
might be at stake was not entirely clear. This danger was somehow sensed by the 
Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, the Bill of Rights’ main proponents. The latter 
disregarded this fear too lightly, except maybe “Brutus”, whose logic of the expan-
sion of the Supreme Court power should have made him more cautious as far as 
putting too much stress on the formal Bill of Rights. Nevertheless from the time of 
the adoption of the Constitution to the Civil War, the view was that individual rights 
were in essence constitutional rights, the language and the logic of the Declaration 
of Independence being suppressed, or better to say disregarded.
The rights were to be protected through the employment of proper institutions, 
something visible in the Acts of Congress, as reflected in the Judiciary Act of 1789 
or the U.S. Supreme Court judgments. In a more pernicious way this interpretation 
was visible in the Southern states’ adamant efforts to treat states’ rights as a means 
of preserving slavery, or from a different angle by the Northern states’ attempts 
before the Civil War to impose particular state laws nullifying the application of the 
federal fugitive slave laws. The Southern strategy was ironic. It ostensibly diffused 
a classical Hamilton’s and Madison’s Federalist argument against the federal Bill 
of Rights. But from the Federalist perspective, the states becoming the principal de-
fenders of a model of using state institutions to secure rights, were in fact mocking 
the very essence of rights and the whole constitutional system. 
36 On this revolt of the elites in Europe as contrasted to America see: A. B ryk, The United States, 
the European Union, Eastern Europe: Challenges and Different Responses to Modernity, “Krakowskie Studia 
Międzynarodowe” 2008, No. 1, p. 206–227; the post-1968 analysis of the phenomenon, especially in America 
see: C. Lash, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy..., New York 1994.
37 This was visible, for instance, in James Madison’s letter to Thomas Jefferson of October 17, 1788, 
[in:] The Mind of the Founder: Sources of Political Thought of James Madison, ed. M. Meye r s, New York 
1973, p. 205–209. For a good exposition of this aspect of institutions as protectors of rights see: M. D iamond, 
The Founding of the Democratic Republic, Itasca 1981, also h i s: The Separation of Powers and the Mixed 
Regime, “Publius” 1978, Vol. 8, p. 33–43.
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For some, this crucial step of transformation was taken by Abraham Lin-
coln, who appealed to the Declaration of Independence’s language of natural rights, 
especially equality, as a controlling and interpreting value of the entire American 
constitutional system. For some, like Harry Jaffa, James McPherson or Garry Wills, 
this reinterpretation of the American constitutional tradition in the light of the Dec-
laration of Independence was not only logical, even if forgotten, but desperately ne-
cessary to make the American political practice commensurate with exactly the very 
essence of the American constitutional tradition. For others, like M.E. Bradley or 
Wilmoore Kendall, such an interpretation, whatever its motives, was revolutionary, 
in fact subverting the U.S. Constitution, and unleashing a train of thought which wo-
uld make this principle of equality a loose canon and a pernicious influence on Ame-
rican political life, eventually subverting it against the best efforts of the Founders.
This argument between the two camps was honest, not entirely commensu-
rate with the traditional liberal and conservative split, and amounted to a difference 
between a faith in the automatic efficacy of the constitutional institutions, even if 
delayed, to rectify the practical wrongs of the American system, and the necessity 
to go beyond the institutions and appeal beyond the Constitution to eternal rights, 
natural or divine, to bring the Constitution in accord with its true potential. Lincol-
n’s interpretation got a boost through the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
and Fifteenth Amendments, which enabled a clarification and constitutionalization 
of individual rights and opened a debate about what constituted individual rights 
within the American system, with courts added to traditional legislatures, beginning 
increasingly to enforce those rights. During the course of the next century the in-
dividual rights, the interpretation of which became increasingly the province of the 
courts, began to be interpreted not only as rights stemming from the Constitution 
itself, but from humanity, that is natural rights defined as modern human rights as 
such, if need be requiring an alteration of the U.S. constitutional system.38 The chan-
ge was radical, although not visible for a long time, and amounts today to a crucial 
question what are the ultimate sources of legitimacy of the U.S. political system, 
the Constitution stemming from the will of “We, the people”, or the human rights.39
In the 1950s and ‘60s this movement towards enlargement of individual ri-
ghts reached its nadir, being imposed by the Supreme Court verdicts, in the wake 
38 The expansion of rights was very much strengthened, of course, by the concept of unenumerated 
rights which the Constitution allowed, with the Ninth Amendment being interpreted as a license to this, the 
unenumerated rights being a safety valve retained by “the people”. See on that a voluminous literature, for 
instance: The Rights Retained by the People: the History and meaning of the Ninth Amendment, ed. R. E. Ba r-
ne t t, Fairfax VA 1989, 1993.
39 See: J. A. Rabk in, Law Without Nations? Why Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign 
States, Princeton 2005; A. B ryk, Is a Nation State Obsolete?, [in:] America in Transition, Warszawa 2010; 
R. H. Bo rk, Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges, Washington D.C. 2003; from a slightly different 
perspective of Europe see C. De l so l, Unjust Justice: Against the Tyranny of International Law, Wilmington 
DE 2004; P. Manen t, Democracy without Nations: The Fate of Self-Government in Europe, ISI Books 2007, 
and h i s  A World Beyond Politics? A Defense of the Nation-State, Princeton 2006; R. H i r s ch, Towards Juris-
tocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism, Cambridge MA. 2004.
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of “Brown v. Board of Education” of 1954, on the legislative agenda and executive 
orders of presidents. Civil rights increasingly came to mean individual rights in the 
most radical sense, the right of every individual to be free of all but the most mini-
mal external constraints, including group constraints, including also constraints of 
the communal norms.
Here the countercultural revolution of 1968 and the New Left concept of 
“liberation” and “emancipation” from every “oppression”, accepted into the ma-
instream of progressive liberalism provided a perfect match to such a tendency 
of interpreting rights. This was the case, again as the New Left slogan declared, 
especially in its feminist version, that “the private was political”, that is that every 
facet of human life was riddled with unequal, a.k.a. unjust relations. The rights 
began to be treated increasingly as a province of human wants and desires, defined 
by an autonomous self’s moral autocreation of self-explicating reason. This was 
coupled increasingly with an idea of civil rights as being in congruence with human 
rights, gaining legitimacy in the international context. Created as the sole justifying 
characteristics of a just political regime in the wake of the Second World War, they 
slowly ceased to be defined by the then prevailing Christian anthropology and on-
tology, referring instead to a generic concept of human dignity as its justification. 
But that concept meant in practical terms that humans have rights because they 
have dignity which is expressed in rights, which is essentially a circular argument. 
Such dignity becomes, in fact, defined by an autonomous self, demanding rights 
from others and the welfare state without any pretence of universal justification in 
relation to a criterion higher than an autonomous moral autocreation.40
We have increasingly got into a postmodern conception of rights defined 
simply as including both liberties and entitlements. In such a situation people are 
at liberty
to do what they will, provided that what they do does not seriously infringe upon the ri-
ghts of others to do the same… [Moreover] individuals are free to do almost anything, but the 
civil society, usually in its institutions of government, is expected to guarantee individuals their 
basic needs and more-in essence entitlements… Accompanying this shift is the loss of the general 
consensus that there is an Author of Nature. Belief in God is still the predominant popular belief 
… But the new image of God is one of a benign crutch who makes almost no demands other than 
we love one another [whoever we are and whatever we do]. This God is no longer seen as the best 
owner or definer of rights and obligations, or even as the Author of nature, from whose moral order 
rights and obligations flow. This causes matters to be much more fluid and easily fosters the new 
understanding of rights as liberties and entitlements. This further sharpen and clarify the contrast 
between modern and postmodern conception of rights … The principal modern rights – life, liberty, 
property, and the pursuit of happiness – were Aristotelian in nature. That is to say, they had some 
view of civil society as a comprehensive whole. The triad of postmodern rights – welfare, expres-
sion, and privacy as liberties and entitlements – are Epicurean in nature; they have to do with the 
individual, not with civil society. No social dimension is necessary involved here… The isolated 
individual takes precedence over any social dimension that might be introduced… The new doctri-
ne of rights treats the moral autonomy of the individual as an absolute. This is the total reversal of 
40 P. Manen t, The City of Man...
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the earlier understanding of rights as growing out of civil society … the moral truth of the correct 
moral theory is replaced by relativism. Whatever the moral beliefs of the people happen to be will 
determine what rights the people have. Under such circumstances constitutionalism itself is chal-
lenged. Under the original theory, although the constitutions could be interpreted often with great 
liberality and flexibility, still they had a veto over actions that went beyond a certain point-that is, 
were unconstitutional. That indeed, was the whole purpose of a constitution. Under the relativistic 
conditions of postmodern understanding of rights, the most that a constitution will have is a vote. 
This eliminates the whole purpose of constitutionalism and opens up unlimited possibilities for 
a relativistic system of rights and actions.41
In other words a constitution ceased to be an instrument for protecting parti-
cular people defining for themselves a good concept of life as a community, subject 
only to periodic alterations. It became a framework of ensuring rights and entitle-
ments of individuals defined by an autonomous self, with courts guarding access 
to such rights in the public sphere, and state agencies having obligations to fulfill 
such rights and entitlements whatever they are, subject only to limitations of peace 
and order, and guaranteed by an increasing motley of administrative rules ensuring 
the non-collision nature of such entitlements. A state, subject to such demands and 
obligations, gradually abandons its political character, becoming a purely admini-
strative body of the therapeutic welfare state.42
Mansfield stands at the center of this debate, although his argument is as 
nuanced as it is prudent. His conception of rights is taken from the classical liberal 
tradition as represented by John Locke and the American Founding. The old rights 
as presented by them, he claims, were the rights of man, that is human beings who 
had a fixed nature and lived also according to alterable laws and customs. Men of 
course have by nature the power to alter laws and customs, thus one can say that 
their nature is partly fixed and partly alterable. But the rights pertain to the fixed part 
and thus they are inalienable, and cannot be taken away by bad customs and laws, 
because they are not granted by good ones. Without fixed human nature, there could 
be no inalienable rights. Natural rights belong to natural man, that is a man in a state 
of nature, not in the sense as Rousseau conceived them, but in the Biblical one in the 
Book of Genesis. In the United States these were the rights to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness stated in the Declaration of Independence of 1776, the rights 
for the sake of which Americans established the Constitution of 1787. 
The rights secured in the Constitution are civil rights, like the ones written in the 
Bill of Rights. They are more specific and more limited than natural rights, since by 
entering civil society people deprive themselves of the exercise of natural rights in or-
der to establish a constitution securing precisely such rights. In other words, rights are 
defined by law in a concrete, precise, operational way. For Mansfield therefore there 
should be a necessity of constitutional form standing over natural rights. The Consti-
41 D. J. E l aza r, How the Present Conception of Human Rights Shape the Protection of Rights in the 
United States, [in:] Old Rights and New, ed. R. A. L i ch t, Washington D.C. 1993, p. 46–49.
42 See on that, for instance, P.E. Go t t f r i ed, After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial 
State, Princeton 1999.
56 ANDRZEJ BRYK
tution of 1787 thus puts, Mansfield claims, its own form before the end its serves, as 
a kind of a safety valve. Crucial for this transformation from natural rights to civil 
rights is the consent of the governed to a government with the power to make and 
enforce laws. This right of consent is both natural and civil, and a crucial bridge 
between natural and civil rights. 
It is true that the Founders, for instance Madison, claimed that the ultimate aim 
of a constitutional system was justice, “the end of government”. Mansfield, though, 
does not want to claim that the standard for rule is the regime itself, a position close 
to mere legal positivism. But nature and reason were not enough to define the proper 
means of governance and the proper scope of rights. They have to be filtered by the 
constitutional mechanism of consent, construed in a deft way, so the moral sense of 
the people, equal politically in a process of consent, can show itself. Thus the people 
use their right of consent to establish a constitution that secures and thereby limits 
their rights, specifying certain civil rights in the Bill of Rights. But
the principal security it offers, more than the naming of those rights, is the form of govern-
ment it constructs. A well-formed constitutional government gives effect to the right of consent, 
which would otherwise remain abstract. In such a government the majority rules, but not a factious, 
willful majority. With such constitutional provisions as the separation of powers and federalism, 
the ruling majority should be a constitutional majority. Though of course partisan, it should be 
respectful of the rights of the minorities and mindful of the common good. Without a working con-
stitutional government a list of rights is of little account, even if all agree on their desirability. Not 
merely the judiciary but the whole government serves to secure rights; and this means that prompt 
executive action is as necessary as careful legislation and wise adjudication.43
Rights in the old conception have two opposite qualities, thinks Mansfield. 
They are formal and they are connected to interests. The formality of rights refers to 
a difference between the formal possession of a right and its actual exercise; it is the 
business of government to secure the former and not the latter. We have to execute 
our rights. If a government exercises such a right for the people, then the people have 
no rights. Formality of rights causes difficulty, of course, since, as Mansfield claims, 
though rights are equal formally, they are in practice necessarily unequal. Natural diffe-
rences in human nature, combined with the variance of luck, will cause some to exercise the right 
of free speech or the right of acquiring property more successfully than others. A gap between the 
idea of equal rights and the reality of unequal exercise will appear it is an inevitable feature of any 
society based on rights. An attempt to close it completely would require so much force and regu-
lation that the rights intended to be secured would in fact be suffocated. Any such attempt would 
inevitably contravene the right of consent or the right to vote.44
But the rights are connected to interests, an eighteenth-century feature added 
to the Lockean conception of rights. Interests are of course opposite to the formality 
of rights, since they describe in general how one can expect rights actually to be 
43 H. C. Mans f i e ld  jr., Responsibility vs. Self-Expression, [in:] Old Rights and New..., p. 98–99.
44 Ibidem, p. 99.
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exercised. But interests are not commensurate with a whimsical desire about what 
one wants to do. Interests, as Mansfield understands well, are not tantamount to 
license but normatively to virtue, or should be educated this way. Our interest
derives from our human nature, but it is not confined, like natural rights, to the state of 
nature; it continues with equal or heightened alertness into civil society… Through the connection 
of interests, rights gain not only sobriety but also many supporters, whose interests lie in the main-
tenance of the rights by which they profit. Since interests derive from human nature, they are active 
in all human societies… [But] what interests consist of?... They are an average reason joined – and 
confined – to an impersonal self. [The United States constitutional system] relies [thus] on a sense 
of responsibility. Responsibility is the rights-based transformation of what used to be called duty or 
virtue. Duty implies devotion to something higher than ourselves, and virtue implies a concern with 
perfection of one’s soul. Both can be found in a society of rights, but they are not truly consistent 
with its emphasis on the self-preservation of individuals. Rights seem to say that human beings 
are sovereign and that devotion to a higher being or a larger whole is a matter of choice, not duty. 
Virtue is self-assured, as one cannot be fully virtuous without an awareness of the worth of virtue.45
But virtue calls for perfection, thus as Edmund Brudke rightly said, seems 
to be limited to a few. It also requires us, even demands to admire, even abey, those 
few. Virtue is not tantamount to the equality of rights. But responsibility is of hu-
man origin and it is democratic. Responsibility is the act voluntarily taking charge 
of a situation in order to improve it. Such responsibility is exercised in the context 
of rights and interests, which consitute two pillars of human moral life, but is not 
identical to them. Human right is wider than his reponsibility, but human interest is 
narrower. Liberalism in practice needs responsibility, because rights and interests are 
too theoretical to suffice for themselves. That is why many people have to be willing 
to take actions for which, in rights theory at least, the lack sufficient reason. The 
old conception of rights grounds them in the human nature that gives human beings 
certain abilities. For this reason, one does not have a right without an ability to claim 
it. Thus the best evidence for this ability is the actual claiming of right by someone.
One must … ‘stand up for’ one’s rights. When one stands up for his own rights, he also 
stands up for others in a like situation. He renounces inactivity; he refuses to ‘take this sitting down’. 
Perhaps a certain aristocratic sense of honor and generosity is at the origin of the democratic notion 
of responsibility. Through the notion of responsibility liberal democracies recapture the love of the 
noble and the concern for the whole that seems so foreign to them and yet so ineradicably human. 
That achievement is the basis of Uncle Sam. To summarize the old rights… They are derived from 
a fixed human nature; they belong to competent individuals; they are equal; they are protected by 
private property; they are divided into natural and civil rights; their key is the right of consent; they 
are constitutional; they are formal; they are connected to interests; and they are responsible. Every 
one of these qualities is denied or radically modified in the new rights that are claimed today.46
45 Ibidem, p. 100–101
46 Ibidem, p. 101–102.
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What are these new rights? Mansfield gives one of the best analyses of the 
new situation of liberal societies subverting themselves with this new conception of 
rights which were decoupled from responsibility as such. An idea was that
rights are not secure unless they are entitlements, protected from the common good. [Thus] 
judges have expected the rights of defendants without regard to the effect on crime. The women’s 
movement has gained equal rights for women without considering, or in some cases caring, for the 
consequences of the family. In particular, the right of abortion releases fathers from responsibility 
for children because it necessarily implies that every child is born through the sole decision of the 
mother to abort … the rights were conceived and established without regard for, and even in defian-
ce of, their effect on responsibility. The new rights are irresponsible not so much because they are 
careless of the cost-benefit equation, or because they are insufficiently utilitarian, as because they 
make people irresponsible: ‘I have my right; it’s up to you to adjust’.47
This new conception of rights was born with Friedrich Nietzsche’s doctrine 
of the creative self and came to American politics in full force in the 1960s, coupled 
with the New Left slogan of “liberation” from all oppressions. But German histo-
ricism taken from German philosophy influenced American pragmatism, which in 
turn influenced the progressives, both the most influential intellectual movements 
as for as theory of rights. According to Mansfield pragmatism, generally thought 
to be quintessentially American, was in fact subverting American tradition since
it denies human nature and thus subjects rights to the contingency of circumstances. That 
historical circumstances could be harnessed under democratic control was the reformist faith of 
the pragmatists, the progressives and the New dealers. But with the abandonment of human na-
ture, they lost the rational ground of rights and launched themselves, to some extent unwittingly, 
towards Nietzsche’s unfixed self, the self that has to create itself. This new self, lacking any natural 
definition, is obliged to define itself by self-expression. It is obliged, that is, only to the extent of its 
energy. Those selves who are content with convention – or too weak to oppose it – will allow them-
selves to be defined, passively and unauthentically. The creative ones will lead them, not by seeking 
their counsel but by pushing them aside. The creatives are not obliged to respect the rights of other 
selves that lack a natural definition requiring respect, that are inchoate, malleable, or conformist. 
Equal respect goes to those equal in nature; if there are no natures, men are equal only at their 
uninformed origins. As they ‘find their identities’, and acquire qualities, they become unequal.48
But Mansfield shows how this inconsistent doctrine rooted in the idea of an 
authentic and autonomous self, having a tendency to be egotistical and subjuga-
ting the weak, is eager, more than ever at the turn of the 21st century, to push for 
an expanding list of rights, allegedly protecting the weak. This stems both from 
inconsistency in the doctrine itself, with people who carry it still moored in the 
old instincts of moral equality dictated by nature, and from certain paternalistic 
tendencies of the elites having an urge of noblesse oblige, towards, as John Rawls 
called them, the “least advantaged”. But since no natural basis for equality exists 
any more, equality depends on public recognition, meaning “equality in public es-
47 Ibidem, p. 102.
48 Ibidem, p. 103.
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teem”. Public equality is the only recognizable aspect of rights and the demand to 
push for it is incessant. This is a push for equal status which of course never ends, 
the process analyzed well already by Tocqueville or Weber. If you are not equal in 
full public recognition, you do not exist as an equal bearer of rights, since there is 
no intrinsic value of what you do or who you are in relation to human nature. You 
exist because you are public, and your right is what you demand in public on the 
basis of your autonomous decision and on the basis of morality which is essentially 
a form of moral auto-creation by sheer will. 
Thus a right is something which is commensurate with the public recogni-
tion of a desire of a moment, even if justifications for that right might be elaborate. 
This way the definition of a human being changes. The human being has no intrin-
sic value any more, no human dignity in relation to a fixed nature and nature’s God 
which gives him or her an untouchable ontological position, irrespective of what 
the public image of that is. Human dignity is now defined solely in terms of rights, 
defined in turn as the totality of actual desires of an autonomous self. The human 
being thus becomes a possessor of rights which he or she defines increasingly for 
him/herself on the basis of an autonomous will, without any universal reference 
pointing towards immutable, unchangeable nature or God. As such, an individual 
demands full recognition of himself on equal basis with others, defining human di-
gnity as a full recognition of the totality of his desires defined as rights, for a simple 
reason that he or she possesses no criteria of differentiating between them on the 
basis of any value judgment and hierarchical ordering.49
Mansfield shows this paradoxical debasement of the modern concept of rights 
in relation to nature and a push for a public recognition of equality of rights, in fact 
a baing recognition of desires, especially in relation to women. This is so since such 
a concept of rights greatly affected relations between sexes, pushing women into 
a position of competition for public recognition. Until this change occurred, women 
had largely been excluded from “responsible positions”, that is jobs recognized as 
having public reputation, not solely by the fact of having formal rights denied. But 
women recognized then the highest value of ordinary tasks of life for a civilized 
order of human relations and relations between men and women in general, as 
being of equal value to public tasks in the limelight. They had no need to prove 
themselves to be equal to men in moral terms, recognizing the equal moral status 
of complementarity. 
Now, due to a new feminist understanding of equal rights, 
women may still feel drawn to the woman’s job that is never done, but because their identi-
ties must be created by public esteem, they have no justification for doing what they very well see 
still needs doing. The new rights of equality do not put supper on the table. They only make women 
who do cook feel like fools.50
49 An excellent exposition of this problem from another angle is in P. Manen t, The City of God... and 
A World Beyond Politics?…
50 H. C. Mans f i e ld, Responsibility vs. Self-Expression..., p. 103.
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There are dire consequences of this new conception of rights, which creates 
an unpredictable, insecure individuals, ever thirsting for a position of power. This 
happens for the simple reason that creative beings in such a situation become open-
ended. Their only mode of operation is will, moral-autocreation and the constant 
fever of transformation in the process of thirsting for something new in the future, 
allegedly better, at least in terms of refreshing one’s image in relations to others, 
and thus being recognized by others. The open-endedness of one’s life requires 
constant movement; there is no stable point of reference in relation to which one 
can psychologically, morally and eventually psychically rest. 
The whole life becomes nomadic, shifting sands of existential anxiety. Re-
lative beings are open-ended not merely in their formal potentialities yet. Such 
beings in fact have great difficulties recognizing their own interests; in fact they do 
not have them, for
who can say what is in the interest of a being that is becoming something unknown? Thus 
the society of new rights is characterized by a loss of predictability and normality: no one knows 
what to respect, even from his closest companions. Under the old rights the notion of interest was 
used as a lever to pry individuals and groups out of the fates destined for them by tradition: it was 
in one’s interest to get ahead. But now those interests are seen as confining; instead of liberating 
they imprison their victims in stultifying ‘roles’. A role is where one has been put formal promise 
of liberty. In the case of women, the system of new rights does not permit one to consult women’s 
interests to see whether they are likely to benefit from equalized rights. Nor are women given any 
guide except the trend fashion, which is ambivalent between work and home. What remains is cho-
ice, unguided and untended by society, as if it did not matter whether women like to have children 
and whether society needs them. To put it mildly, the element of society supplied by the notion of 
interest to a rights-based society is forgone.51
The consequences of such a conception of rights for political life, as Mans-
field observed, was grave. In such a situation, government is not needed to mo-
derate natural rights in this new scheme, nor does it provide a framework for an 
expression of consent which moderates between natural and civil rights. The ac-
tivity of citizens as a community, and with that the indispensability and necessity 
of government, are not so sure any more. The formulation of rights is increasingly 
being done, as Mansfield said, by philosophy professors, not political scientists. 
Liberalism was a doctrine which originally was concerned with conditions under 
which rights were surrendered as well as conditions when rights were elaborated. 
Liberalism, in other words, was originally about something political philosophers 
forgot, it was about constitutionalism:
the making of a government to control and to be controlled by the people. The constitution 
of that government is the focus of attention because all rights are secured by and from the govern-
ment. Its form or structure secures rights by governing under law, so that the rule of the majority 
is the rule of a constitutional majority as opposed to a factious majority. The new rights, however, 
are postconstitutional. Since self-expression is the norm, the new rights have little to do with self-
51 Ibidem, p. 104.
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government. Self-expression can lead to ‘participation’, especially in demonstrations of protest, but 
such participation shows little respect for the persuasion, deliberation, and moderation that consti-
tutional structure encourage. Promoters of the new rights look on the Constitution as a system to be 
manipulated – hence, part instrument, part obstacle. They do not think that they live under the Con-
stitution, much less that it is a fundamental law to be venerated. They believe that government is 
for providing services and collecting taxes, and they would be hard put to say what makes it free.52
Human beings, having thus creative rather than natural selves, are in a pro-
cess of constant self-creation, including moral autocreation. But they do not know 
their own selves since they do not exist as stable natures. They are just constructs 
in a fleeting moment of time and an assemblage of personality to fit a particular 
desire. Their personalities, their selves are thus constantly in the future, since there 
is no resting moment when one can “find” oneself. This causes an incessant exi-
stential angst, a feeling that one is never in the right place and for this reason must 
strive for more, so as to find one’s true self. This moment of liquidating such an 
existential anxiety, that is the moment of liquidation of alienation, can never come, 
since a human being cannot save itself by itself. It can only rest in a transcending 
Being which gives an individual a universal and lasting identity and protection. 
The constant search for a true identity of this new “liberated” creative self is like 
running on a treadmill for eternity, a senseless existential predicament.53 Since cre-
ative individuals cannot know their true selves, since they can never be pinpointed 
for more than a fleeting moment in the time and history of the incessant march of 
auto-creation. They can also not know the selves of others, and precisely because of 
that, they cannot have any respect for their rights. The others’ rights are simply equ-
ally fleeting states of mind and psyche on the way towards constant autocreation. 
Self-creation of all nullifies any gravity of any claim whatsoever. There simply 
cannot be any reason why such a claim should have a universal validity for others 
to recognize and respect it, since there are objective criteria of judgment towards 
which such a claim can be subjected. But there is another consequence of such self-
creation of individual existence and with it the rights. 
Self-centered, self-created individuals are simply busy with their own lives, 
they become obsessively narcissistic, including their own rights. They not only do 
not bother to persuade others to accept the latter, since they have absolutely no uni-
versal criteria of validity through which they could persuade others to accept them, 
but they also do not want to be bothered by the persuasion of others, who in turn 
also think the same way. The very idea of rational public debate of a community, 
that is a way of reaching a consensus and formulating legitimate consent, is gone. 
Politics, as life itself, is not only inauthentic, but it has to be that way, since indivi-
duals have abdicated any pretence that their self-created wills and lives could have 
any universal coherence and gravity extending beyond their individual, subjective 
52 Ibidem, p. 108.
53 P. Ha ffne r, Creation and Scientific Creativity: A Study in the Thought of S.L. Jaki, Fort Royal 1991, 
p. 72.
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desire for a moment. They are pure historical beings, where past history, as Henry 
Ford famously remarked in another context, was sheer bunk, with no meaning re-
lated to anything. Creative individuals can relate nothing in their lives and history 
to a definition of themselves as natural beings, with a fixed nature, in other words 
with a definite anthropological and ontological core transcending their constantly 
shifting self-definitions.
A human being becomes truly a God to himself or herself, creating the situation 
so poignantly observed at the end of the Roman Empire, that there were so many gods 
that it was impossible not to offend at least some of them for some of the time. This is 
a condition of a disintegration of society as such, the state of a loss of meaning, 
with individuals left as solitary beings in search of their true selves, and with fear of 
others, who might prevent their desires from being realized. It is for this reason that 
“the rights of historicized beings are impossible to distinguish from wants; even 
‘needs’ come to mean ‘felt needs’. These wants alternate in status between posited 
rights whose positing is not necessary but is merely asserted – the deontological 
view, according to contemporary philosophy – and preferences, capable of being 
‘traded off’ for one another – the utilitarian view. Their status alternates because, 
in practice, proponents find the first view too absolute and the second too relative. 
They have abandoned the distinction between natural and civil rights, by which the 
absoluteness and the relativity of rights are reconciled through the right of consent. 
They have substituted for it two partisan views that cannot be reconciled and hence 
must be alternated”.54 The consequences of such an approach are grave. When rights 
become wants those with wants are no longer pushed to claim their rights and to 
fight for them, and once gained to defend them. 
Rights in other words are a consequence of freedom and of conscious citizen-
ship, or to put it a better way, a political expression of common humanity of equal 
moral people. But wants are merely passive; they do not require conscious efforts to 
gain or defend them; they may be an equivalent of animal functions which, whether 
psychical or psychological or merely emotional, can be provided by somebody else. 
In such conditions when modern rights are understood as wants, they may be provi-
ded by proxy, which means by the elites, or elite groups which may make necessary 
claims on behalf of those who want. Wants can be realized by means of rights, but 
they can as well be realized irrespective of rights, by others exercising such rights in 
the name of those who just want to fulfill their wants. This is an observation which 
Tocqueville made in Democracy in America, in a language of equality as a factor 
which gives the welfare state its full power of control over people’s lives.
But wants are not presented as such. They are presented as rights, since there 
is nothing in a formal contemporary definition of a human being which would di-
stinguish them from a mere self-definition of one’s condition on exactly this basis 
of mere desires, that is wants. For these reasons wants presented as rights force 
individuals to claim them in equal measure, and if they cannot be gotten in a nor-
54 Ibidem, p. 109.
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mal, individual way in a political democratic process, they are being claimed from 
government as an entitlement. Governments, prompted by elite groups, will step 
to guarantee those rights, in effect exercising them better than an individual. When 
government intervenes, it does not have the right to seek someone’s consent or the 
consent of his fellow-citizens, because one’s consent may be too weak and one’s 
fellow citizens may disregard it, overlooking his wants. Under such circumstances
the new rights become ‘entitlements’, originally a technical term for claims on a budget 
that must be paid out regardless of how many claim them. Entitlements are thus secure from re-
sponsibility to what the common good may require… Entitlements do not result from a potential or 
actual contribution of the entitled to the community: not requiring any prior or subsequent action, 
they do not reward rights responsibly exercised. We can certainly get someone else to demand our 
entitlements for us, and we can get someone else to apply for them on our behalf. We do not have 
an answer for how we spend our entitlements, since any failure, for example, to find decent housing, 
is accounted to society, and the remedy is to extend its responsibility to equalize”.55
Equalizing proceeds by denigrating past progress in rights as merely formal, 
not serious, while at the same time demanding that society be perfectly equal and 
thus to equalize all relations in infinite approximation. This causes a situation of 
anxiety, anger, restlessness and la lotta continua to equalize everything, but on the 
other hand such a society of entitlements is rather static, with special interests gu-
arding their turf and demanding rights, that is wants, for themselves as they under-
stand them. This way they make themselves dependent on government largesse or 
administrative and judicial rules, and in the process becoming restless, suspicious, 
demanding and ungrateful, incompetent, and last but not least utterly post-political. 
This means passive and abdicating any interest in public affairs, let alone interest 
to participate, producing a society of utterly non-communal individuals, without 
solidarity and without any ethic of responsibility.
However, the more individual wants, defined as rights, demand from society 
and government their due on the basis of their autonomous will of the unencumbe-
red “self”, the more they want to guard their privacy to enjoy their subjectively defi-
ned wants, i.e. desires from any outside intrusions, whether of others or government 
itself. This is the reason why the right to privacy is the sacred right of the unencum-
bered “self” of the modern human being. This new right to privacy is at the surface 
guarding against government, but in fact it increases dependency on it, increasing, 
not diminishing, responsibility for personal rights. Of course, the old rights were all 
private rights, belonging to private individuals, but they were at the same time civil 
rights, that is limited for the sake of others’ rights and the common good, in which 
the responsible individuals with rights engaged themselves.
The modern right to privacy is yet different. It attempts to define that ri-
ght irrespective of others and community, a sphere into which others’ rights and 
community requirements cannot enter. Such rights today might be, for instance, 
55 Ibidem.
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a woman’s right to abortion or a homosexual’s right to “marry”. The most baleful 
effect of such a right is a colossal misrepresentation of privacy which becomes an 
absolute, a kind of solipsistic engagement in one’s own life as a solitary experien-
ce. In fact privacy traditionally belonged to the province of civil society; it was 
a right to do with others things which government was not allowed to interfere 
with. Others – that is family, friends or private associations. There was never the 
right to privacy to shape one’s own life outside a moral framework of decent, moral 
life, against others. Absolute privacy is available in solitary confinement, of course, 
but its consequences are far-fetched in other areas of human life. It causes a di-
smantling of human solidarity and responsibility on a massive scale, for the simple 
reason that such qualities of character require sharing one’s privacy understood 
as a sovereign will to do with one’s own life what the unencumbered “self” wills. 
Absolute privacy renounces any ties with others as an unnecessary burden causing 
others to do the same towards us.56
Abortion in the United States provides a perfect example how such privacy 
had to be construed, first by government. It is not only a right to be simply claimed 
and recognized by an individual from government. It became much more than that. 
The Supreme Court seized on the right to privacy to defend an unmarried couple’s 
use of not only contraceptives, as was the case in the “Griswold v. Connecticut” 
case of 1965, but also in a way which denied any family interference in the indi-
vidual choice of abortion in “Roe v. Wade” of 1973. The right of privacy defined 
that way was willfully construed by American government in a massive way of 
transformation of culture, where this new right of privacy in fact reflected this go-
vernment’s decision to define what is private and what is not, and then sustain that 
condition by the government’s power. Thus, because the government defines what 
is private, it has to intrude on the private. 
When this government upholds laws which ban contraceptives and abortion 
since they were democratically defined as being against the common good, this de-
cision might be wrong, but the message was clear: to tell citizens that private actions 
have public consequences which require responsibility. The source and immediate 
ends might be private, but the manner of exercise of it is to promote civil society 
and human solidarity as such, that is community. The absolute right to privacy, in 
turn, cuts itself off from any such accompaniment, encouraging citizens to forget 
their citizenship and to become solitary individuals unencumbered by anything but 
their private solipsistic wills of autonomous moral “selves”. Government, or better 
to say a polity, ceases to be a communal affair; it is just an administrative body 
through which individuals have their solitary rights. Such rights are first secured, 
56 Thus the absolute right of a woman to abortion and its underlying philosophy of “my body, my child” 
causes men to look at women as a sexual commodity with their right to “dispose of” the unwanted consequences 
and with a total liberation of them from any responsibility, any caring, in fact any love. In other words I do not 
want you into my life in such a profound act of creation in which you are a necessary condition of that creation, 
but only as a giver of semen. The revenge of men treated that way as simple tools of woman’s desire to shape 
her life in a totally unencumbered way might be, and today very often is, total and brutal.
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and then absolutely guaranteed, in a kind of moral extremism defined as fighting 
for rights, with rights defined in their totality as against others. 
This is done absolutely irrespective of any communal concern, that is a uni-
versal framework of human life, that is irrespective of truth, except the truth of a mo-
mentary desire of an autonomous, unencumbered “self”, creating itself in a process 
of total moral autocreation. Government is here a powerful engine of equalization 
of rights defined in a new ontological and anthropological way, thus it is an engine 
of monistic ideology defined by means of rights.57 But an additional consequence of 
such radical equalization of privacy rights is dependency on government, more than 
dependency on other people, including the closest ones, with taking moral responsi-
bility for them. They have to be responsible for themselves, with government pro-
viding institutional conditions of that responsibility. Thus government organizes all 
the economic, political, moral and emotional energies of solitary individuals into 
a new kind of communal life which depends this time on politically correct actions, 
“good causes”, changing according to any new fashion. Loyalty to government and 
the nexus of powers that be, which define the content of such new causes, becomes 
this time the essence of patriotism.58
Mansfield does not claim that the old rights as civil rights were perfect, inc-
luding a defect between the right and its exercise. But he somehow shies away from 
the fundamental question of whether such civil rights have any validity beyond the 
immediate life of a community, or whether they are, or must be, fundamentally 
derived from a source higher than consent as such. If they are, what is their source 
and how can they be translated into civil rights? Mansfield, a student of Strauss, 
is too much a lover of truth, and with that a lover of classics and the American 
Founding, of which the Declaration of Independence is a part, to renounce such 
a source. Nevertheless, he seems to think that consent is still crucial to a discovery 
of that source.59 Such an approach caused one of the most fascinating, if somewhat 
misunderstood, debates within the Straussian camp [but not only], between the pro-
ponents of natural law as a source of American regime, and the proponents of the 
Constitution as a consensual, institutional framework of deciding the rules of life of 
American community. The argument is symbolized by two contestants, Harry Jaffa 
and Harvey Mansfield, with followers on both sides.60
57 See on that: J. B. E l sh t a in, The Bright Line: Liberalism and Religion, [in:] The Betrayal of Liber-
alism, eds. H. Kramer, R. K imba l l, I. R. Dee, Chicago 1999, p. 148–149; also M. Sande l, Democracy’s 
Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, Cambridge Mass. 1996, p. 3–122.
58 K. Minogue, Polityka, Warszawa 1997, p. 123–125.
59 This is a tradition of James Wilson and his concept of a moral sense inherent in everybody and thus 
possibly to be argued in public by consent. See for instance: R. Ros sum, James Wilson and the “Pyramid of 
Government”, “The Political Science Reviewer”, Fall 1976, p. 123–124.
60 See a thorough account of the argument, if somewhat misunderstood and not altogether fair to H. C. 
Mans f i e ld, [in:] Jaffa versus Mansfield, www.claremont.org/publications/pubid.2.
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Affirmative Action and Tribal Liberalism 
Mansfield has also taken up many topics at the center of contemporary liberal mo-
nism which seem to him ill-conceived and corrupting. He is a critic of affirmative 
action, basing it on the right of consent, the only true source of a moral, free society. 
Affirmative action is slowly beginning to be established as a right of minorities 
to make demands on society, for a variety of reasons, starting from a demand to 
rectify past discrimination, and ending with quota representation reflecting group 
composition in a given society, which would allegedly guarantee a just distribution 
of power. For Mansfield affirmative action is wrong not only because it undermi-
nes individual merit, the essence of liberal democracy. From the point of view of 
American constitutionalism it “undermines the basic principle of [the American] 
Constitution”.61 It subverts a cornerstone of American constitutional system, that 
is the right of consent, and yields to a temptation to establish a universal law of 
justice by means of governmental pressures and judicial verdicts, even against such 
a consent, treating people increasingly as pawns of social engineering concocted 
by the liberal elites.
In that sense the right of consent, an essentially community right, is the most 
fundamental right of free people to deliberate about the virtuous life of that com-
munity and about rights which may provide conditions for eliciting virtues as such. 
Modern liberalism, which tries to influence society’s attitudes by governmental en-
gineering, so as to make it allegedly more just and equal, comes close to subverting 
constitutional government and its basic right of consent as the best way of ensuring 
a moral life of all. For Mansfield consent is in such a case a basic right stemming 
from the inherent moral equality of individuals in a polity, but also because all 
other rights depend on it. Without this right of consent, other rights are merely 
a gift of government, to be granted as well as to be withdrawn by government. Go-
vernment, that is a state, comprising all branches, including the judges, may in such 
a case place upon itself the duty to judge reality outside of people’s consent, or even 
against it, thinking that it is the government which decides the questions of mo-
ral life, thus rights which are to ensure it. In other words that the government is in 
a position to determine questions of justice against the people, or in case of judges 
that they can adjudicate in the name of justice and impartial humanity against a par-
ticular community at hand. 
This also has consequences for the push to establish a worldwide “govern-
ment of human rights”, a menacing quasi-totalitarian structure, which would amo-
unt in fact to the government of “the just” elites, international organizations and 
the most powerful NGOs, all grinding their ideological axes in the name of human 
rights.62 This trend is against legitimate, sovereign power of the people of the Uni-
61 I dem, Pride and Justice in the Affirmative Action, [in:] America’s Constitutional Soul, Baltimore 
1991, p. 97.
62 See: P. Manen t, A World beyond Politics?..., R. H i r s ch, Towards Judistocracy…; J. A. Rabk in, 
Law Without Nations...; C. De l so l, The Unjust Justice...
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ted States giving their consent to their government. In addition, in American con-
stitutionalism it was understood from the beginning that the right of consent is the 
right which, when it is 
exercised to establish a constitution, other rights pass from natural rights, or human rights 
to civil rights, rights enforceable by law that are more limited but more effectually protected than 
abstract natural rights. The right of consent is a matter of justice, because it is just to count each 
person as one. But it is also a matter of pride, for to count as one, each person must count for so-
mething, must be worth something. The right of consent presupposes that each adult is worthy of 
being taken seriously as a rational creature capable of choice, hence worthy of being persuaded 
and not taken for granted. His dignity requires that his consent be sought through persuasion, and 
neither ignored nor presumed. Affirmative action both ignores and presumes. Usually enforced 
by the judiciary, the branch that is furthest from consent, it ignores white males because they are 
presumed to be racist and it presumes the consent of blacks and women because of their race and 
sex63 [which is questionable.]
In other words, there is no other way, claims Mansfield, to build a free and 
inherently just society based on virtus commonly accepted than by this right of con-
sent. There might be a desire to start defining rights in abstracto, and showing a gap 
between reality and our ideals to take a shortcut to engineering a society according 
to the logic of right and power of government, including justices to implement that 
right, for instance according to the abstract logic of justice understood as equality. 
But this gap between ideals and reality is a gap arising from the right of consent and 
reflecting the reality that free men are not free of prejudice. But freedom cannot be 
withheld until all prejudices or inhibitions be cleared away. Otherwise there would 
be a logical conclusion derived from the opposite statement, that men are worthy 
of freedom but not of gaining it on their own.64 
This would entail a presupposition that people are not free and have to wait 
until government has declared them worthy of it. Such a presupposition, claims 
Mansfield, would be an absurdity in a constitutional republic, since there is abso-
lutely no logical presumption that government is in a better position to assess the 
imperatives of justice than a democratic process itself, properly construed, in which 
a right of consent is expressed. Even if government were take on itself a right to 
determine the requirements of justice, that would also be partial and dangerous as 
well, since that might also entail a perverse understanding of justice without a chan-
ce of correction, a case, for instance, with the contemporary Supreme Court, treated 
here as part of government, which declaring a constitutional right is not subject to 
any control or correction but a possible new precedent.65 
63 H. C. Mans f i e ld, Pride and Justice…, p. 95.
64 This was, by the way, the logic of the French revolutionary constitutionalism of 1789, and the inher-
ent tendency of the European elites which have looked at their societies in a paternalistic way, an old tradition 
rooted also in the medieval noblesse oblige.
65 “Dred Scott v. Sandford” of 1857 concerning the status of slaves under the Constitution, and “Roe v. 
Wade” of 1973 pertaining to unlimited access to abortion defined as a constitutional right, constitute the most 
blatant examples of such judicial actions.
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But even if such a choice was properly assessed,
living together in freedom requires more than justice, for after justice has been exacted, 
people are not always in a mood to live together. To put ourselves in the right mood for free society 
we must recognize the dignity of being persuaded. This morality of consent requires us to consent, 
for the sake of our morality, to a gap between reality and our ideals. It also provides a necessary 
check on our moralism, when we try to rush into reform too confident that those who are opposed 
are merely prejudiced. Moralism gives morality a bad name and makes free citizens angry and 
impatient with one another… The right of consent neither prevents us from resorting to compulsion 
when necessary nor disables us from attempting reform when desirable.66
Properly understood, consent operates within certain institutional forms and 
procedures whose observance requires that citizens have to be persuade. Consent 
is registered in legal elections to offices in instutions established by law so that it is 
clear who is the winner and who is the loser, even if only at this particular moment. 
But it tis the majority which has to be able to act after the minority has been held. 
A person right of consent 
is not violated when he has been outvoted, and his dignity has not been denied when he has 
been outargued. The forms and procedures of a free government give definition to the dignity of 
free citizens. It knows when it can act, and we know when we have been consulted. All these forms 
and procedures, together with the spirit in which they are practiced, have been called constitutiona-
lism. They ensure respect for the means by which the right of consent is exercised, and thereby they 
secure respect for the right of consent. They constitute a free society; without such forms a society 
might be tempted to believe that freedom is doing as one pleases, or doing what someone thinks is 
required by justice.67
There is no doubt for Mansfield that affirmative action has no regard for the 
forms and procedures that serve as protection of the right of consent. Such proce-
dures are treated as obstacles on the way to the universal law of justice, and the new 
ones are established so as to advance this goal. Justice ceases to be in such a case 
a deliberative attempt of free people to establish a decent society according to the 
procedures which ensure dialogical form of democracy and final consent agreed to 
by all, even if imperfect, and even if in a course of such an action some are tempo-
rarily outvoted. Justice it begins to be treated as an ideal guarded and implemented 
by the self-proclaimed elites acting along the lines of aristocratic noblesse oblige, 
in the name and sometimes against free will of the people expressed through de-
mocratic procedures.
That is why, claims Mansfield, what is “worst about affirmative action is the 
Machiavellian underhandedness of pretence and manipulation with which it aims 
to secure a good result”.68 For this reason this inherent gap between the idea and 
reality is not only a price which democracy pays for being a place of free people 
66 H. C. Mans f i e ld, Pride and Justice..., p. 96–97.
67 Ibidem, p. 97.
68 Ibidem.
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deciding about their conception of life, but it is also a prudent attempt to establish 
such procedures and rules so a rush to form a perfect society could be slowed down, 
an adult understanding of the inherent traps of reality and human existence as such. 
Prudence is here a proper word which Mansfield uses in many other instances very 
frequently, and which reflects an understanding that a free society is a delicate 
and imperfect construction which requires great statesmanship, rightly understood 
politics and a great dose of humility coming from a sober thoughtfulness, in which 
political philosophy may be one of the aides.
Gender Feminism and the Incessant War on Men and Women
Mansfield is also a great critic of gender feminism as a form of modern ideology 
based not only on false, taken for granted anthropological assumptions, but also 
contributing mightily to a subversion of the delicate balance between sexes. Gen-
der feminism terrorizes both sides with its ideology, and brutalizes both language 
and mutual relations sowing mistrust and bitterness. Mansfield has touched upon 
feminism in many ways and many places, but his major work in which he deals 
with the issue is Manliness, a book both about manliness and a not so subtle pole-
mic with gender feminism, in fact the main villain of the book. 
Manliness, as Mansfield puts it, is a concept closely related to the one that 
Plato and Aristotle called andreia, for which the usual English translation is “coura-
ge”, and it is andreia which is his subject. To title a book Manliness at the American 
academy was surely inviting the strict scrutiny of feminist ideologues and their aco-
lytes. But to structure the book in such a way as to defend the very concept of man-
liness and showing how radical gender feminism destroys it, destroying at the same 
time mutual relations between men and women, was surely to provoke a torrent of 
the most vicious attacks from the feminist orthodoxy and its followers, acting like 
Pavlov’s dogs. In itself it was an act of intellectual and moral courage.
Modern feminism is a hugely diverse set of positions and arguments. Mans-
field has no problem with equity feminism, which was sorely needed and which 
has, in principle, been accomplished. He has, though, an insurmountable problem 
with gender feminism, also extremely diversified within itself. Gender feminism 
defines its view of the world on the basis of some a priori stated assumptions about 
the reality of human life and then tries to reorient it accordingly. The main problem 
with gender feminism is that it is not verifiable and that it is ideological, and last 
but not least that there is no definite end point of the revolution it conducts, with 
the feminist ideologues deciding arbitrarily on the victories or defeats of particular 
stages of their fight. Or to put it in another words: that in fact radical gender femi-
nism is not about equality and justice, but about a power grab and identity politics, 
and justifying such a policy with high-brow values aimed at silencing the enemy.
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Some feminists would respond, as Martha Nussbaum did, that Mansfield
utterly ignores the existence of male feminists though they are many. Feminism is a concern 
with justice, not an exercise in identity politics… Feminists, then have not typically sought a socie-
ty in which there are no gender distinctions. They have challenged imposed and unchosen gender 
norms that interfere with women’s freedom and functioning… What feminists have sought above 
all is a society in which there are no sex-based hierarchies, in which the sheer luck of being born 
a female does not slot one into an inferior category for the purposes of basic political and social 
functioning.69
But Mansfield calmly responds that it is not the overt slogans and aims of 
the radical gender feminist movement which should be looked at, but the verity 
of the assumptions taken for granted and the means employed to execute them. In 
other words it is not propaganda which counts, but the congruence of idea with real 
life, which when found wanting elicits a campaign for social engineering akin to 
the once executed plan of equating the liberation of workers with the victory of the 
Bolshevik Soviet Union. Again, as Nussbaum says, showing the utter helplessness 
of the gender feminist ideology itself,
What non-discrimination means for gender difference is not yet clear, because people have 
only begun to experience non-discrimination. Using the religious analogy, however, we might pre-
dict that once gender is no longer a source of hierarchy and subordination, people will express 
themselves more and more personally where gender is concerned… In sum, when people are not 
forced their choices make sense for them and the lives they want to lead. So, too, in relationships, 
some women will choose flirtiness, others a “manly” directness. Some men will like taking care of 
children, if government and employers give them decent support; others will try to avoid care, and 
women will be able, let us hope, to see that one coming in advance and make the choices they want 
to make in response. Some women attach great importance to that identity, and others will care less. 
What really troubles Mansfield, I fear, is personal liberty itself, and the diversity that a culture of 
personal self-expression fostered by non-discrimination, brings with it.70
There is nothing wrong with such a vision of a non-discriminating society, 
except two things which are certainly crucial, and Mansfield knows that. First there 
is absolutely no end point to the concept of discrimination since we do not know 
what the concept of discrimination is, or what the concept of non-discrimination in 
fact means. There is absolutely no way such a society which seeks for itself what 
discrimination and justice means in relations between sexes can be left to indivi-
dual means to determine it, it has to be pressured to obliterate a boundary between 
the private and the public, despite all the disclaimers of Nussbaum to the contrary. 
Second, there is assumed here the definite concept of a human being as an absolu-
te autonomous individual making choices for herself and himself on the basis of 
moral autocreation and self-perception of such an individual life, which must be, 
allegedly, the end point of discrimination. But that presupposes that this is the only 
69 M. C. Nussbaum, Man Overboard, “The New Republic” 2006, June 26, p. 31–32.
70 Ibidem, p. 32.
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legitimate concept of human existence worth pursuing, and that there is no non-di-
scrimination until individuals become such autonomous human beings, absolutely 
fluid according to their choices.
This means that if there are institutions which profess overtly to shape pe-
oples’ characters, like families or churches, according to a different vision of human 
anthropology, of who a human being truly is, or should be, they are by definition 
suspect, defined immediately as discriminatory. If so, such institutions should be 
pressured to give up their pretences to any education or in Nussbaum’s vision “di-
scrimination” in terms of an alternative vision, and should be pressured to give up 
their teachings. This freedom of such autonomous institutions is then obliterated, 
and with that human freedom as such. Nussbaum would say that the individuals co-
uld choose freely also such positions as those autonomous institutions teach them, 
without inculcating them. This is a fallacy; no one can choose a definite morality as 
morality without first a vision of a particular anthropology informing it being incul-
cated into their character by a conscious teaching. Nussbaum’s vision understands 
non-discrimination as a kind of society with solitary, egotistical human beings, 
including women and men. This is exactly, reading between the lines, Mansfield’s 
concern, an utter inability to teach in such a civilization of any definite character, in 
a truly Aristotelian fashion, thus to teach caritas, which Nussbaum in another place 
puts as an end of education of autonomous individuals under the supervision of 
proper pedagogues. She writes that
we want to produce young people who have the sort of courage that [for instance] the rescu-
ers [of the Jews during the war] embody ... we want to be sure that boys and girls both grow up with 
the capacity for concern and care, and the ability to take responsibility for the situation of others, 
traits that seem to be sorely lacking in American society today … so many people in our money and 
fame – focused society do not get much experience taking care of anyone or anything and are too 
lacking in a sense of responsibility.71
It is sheer fallacy to create such concerns in a society in which, first of all, 
people are pressured to be autonomous beings making choices for themselves. What 
one may create are not caring individuals, but individuals paying more for the we-
lfare state disposing of the problems of human heart. Second of all, the notion of ca-
ring is predicated on a particular anthropology. Caring in such a case, in Nussbaum’s 
vocabulary, includes tending to the poor but also excluding tending to the unborn. 
In other words Nussbaum’s vision is purely ideological and non-pluralistic, that is 
profoundly discriminatory at a much deeper level than just the relations between 
men and women. It is fundamentally discriminatory at the level of anthropology, 
in fact ontology, allowed to be pursued in a liberal society and the one which could 
not be pursued. It is in fact anti-pluralistic, anti-freedom and anti-politics, to wit 
totalitarian. And this is exactly Mansfield’s point. One can explicate and develop the 
point Mansfield just implies in more elaborate terms, since his criticism is a critique 
71 Ibidem, p. 33.
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of a certain strand of liberalism which has a totalitarian potential and threatens the 
constitutional government per se.
Nussbaum, criticizing Mansfield, defines the human being as a person solely 
through a prism of egalitarianism in all walks of life and in relation to everything, 
which requires a particular concept of anthropology based on the radical choice of an 
autonomous subject interacting with other such subjects.72 This is a definite anthro-
pology narrowing human person to a particular frame, which also requires a constant 
overview of human relations and power to execute them according to a preconce-
ived, ideological vision. The egalitarians bear the burden of explaining why their the-
ory should be the sole organizing axis of human relations and governmental policy 
executing it. In other words they should justify their standards of a non-discrimina-
tory society. This is nearly impossible, since their ideal dictates them standards then 
applied to a non-ideal, complicated, but first all wonderfully rich society with people 
living in it. Such an approach is of course extremely dangerous, since on its basis 
egalitarians evaluate political and private arrangements. And they, of course, are al-
ways forced to find them wanting, since this richness of life and the recalcitrance of 
relations between the sexes belie their best efforts to make such a society operative. 
This forces them to apply more and more sophisticated policies to disman-
tle this rich, actual web of relations between, for instance, the sexes, to use force 
when necessary, the force of law as well as the symbolic violence of castrating 
a language and enforcing a particular behavior. They become more and more fru-
strated and thus focused on a continuous fight for such a nondiscriminatory society, 
the fight which must go on incessantly, against both the men and the women who 
are not conscious of their own interests and exhibit false consciousness. La lotta 
continua has to go on and delve deeper and deeper into the private sphere, and then 
ultimately into the human mind and psyche in a process of forced psychotherapy, 
ultimately ending with biological engineering when confronted with the resisting 
barrier of biology.73 There is thus a profound paradox in the feminist thought, stem-
ming from its ideological framework, akin to the once regnant Stalin’s idea, for 
whom the more a society was becoming socialist, the more the class warfare was 
exacerbating. The gender feminist approach is wrong right from the beginning, sin-
ce it is based on the illusion that to improve bad political and private arrangements 
is to make them conform ever closely to an ideal taken for granted and arbitrarily 
chosen in a process of subjecting the richness of life to a monistic ideology. 
This gives rise to policies which are dangerously utopian, since this ideal 
theory from which they stem are anthropologically wrong, historically uninformed, 
politically cost-ridden and impractical and, last but not least, morally unaccepta-
ble. They ignore not only the actual conditions of particular societies, but also the 
real freedom of individual human beings, and this fairly tale about the non-discri-
72 See on that J. Kekes, The Illusions of Egalitarianism, Ithaca 2003, p. 100–105, 107–114, 145–150.
73 On this la lotta continua character of such a liberal frame of mind see K. Minogue, Polityka, 
Warszawa 2001, p. 124–125.
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minatory society shows the inescapable sinister face of a utopian totalitarian, for 
whom any fact contradicting the ideal is treated, must be treated as evidence that 
the conditions of a society are not ideal, that is, in this instance, not non-discrimi-
natory. This is also dangerous for another reason. It puts the burden of shaping such 
a non-discriminatory society, and individual relations between sexes in it, solely 
on the social conditions properly construed. Individual women and men are treated 
as innocent victims of forces beyond their control, forces which gender feminist 
“experts” and ideologues can dissect and then properly arrange, supposedly having 
a privileged insight of the wise “chosen” into the intricacies of human existence.
This is a gnostic impulse which requires an enlightened elite saving people 
incapable of that insight. But there is an additional assumption here, an assump-
tion that human beings are inherently good, that evil is of social origin and with 
proper social and individual relations this evil will be eliminated. This widespread 
evidence of evil makes egalitarians absolutely helpless not only in the face of its 
obvious intractability as a fact of human personal existence, making people so-
mehow relieved of an effort to recognize good and bad deeds morally and to take 
responsibility for them, including the expectation of punishment and reward, and 
possibly striving to be better than they themselves are. This evidence of evil as 
a result of arrangements lying beyond human control, until the proper political and 
social arrangements have been put in place, makes human beings demanding, and 
absolutely incapable of accepting any unequal relations between people, any just 
policies which aim at rewarding or punishing people for their individual moral de-
eds, in other words incapable of accepting any moral discrimination as just.
Egalitarians, to wit, are forced to accept such a stance and to demand to 
treat people with equal respect regardless of their moral standing. If such facts of 
discrimination on the basis of moral judgments concerning individual behavior oc-
cur, the egalitarians view them as lamentable and also predictable in an imperfect 
society of discrimination.
This new society has to replace the present, discriminatory one. The imme-
diate problems of discrimination necessarily bear no relation to this new one.74 The 
liberal egalitarians, like gender feminists, thus start from an abstract definition of 
a social problem defined as unequal, or discriminatory, or non-tolerant. In fact it 
bears little relevance to the particular society at hand. Social dysfunction or inco-
herence arise out of an ideal which liberal egalitarians concoct. Then this ideal is 
couched in moral, positive terms and defined as a need to be realized if a society is 
to be described as equal, just, non-discriminatory. The State, its laws and force can 
impose such an ideal of this order on actual society. This way egalitarian liberals, 
including gender feminists as well, want to make society into a single organization 
reflecting their ideal administered by the state.
But there is a paradox in such a liberal thinking, connected with two of its 
enshrined concepts of autonomy and toleration. For liberal egalitarians like Nuss-
74 I dem, The Liberal Mind, Indianapolis 1963, p. 123–138.
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baum, autonomy and choice over one’s own life as a precondition of equality of 
relations between men and women is a sine qua non condition of just, and ultima-
tely good life. Liberal egalitarianism of this version – and this is a dominant ver-
sion of it today – defines a “good life” thoroughly in terms of autonomy, the view 
constitutionally sealed in the notorious judgment of the Supreme Court in “Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey” of 1992.75 The core of such a definition is its insistence that 
forms of social life, to be equal and just, are to “be rooted in the self-conscious af-
firmations of autonomous individuals”.76 One of the main proponents of this shape 
of liberalism of choice, or moral autocreation, Ronald Dworkin, allegedly harking 
back to the Kantian autonomy principle, but in fact resembling the nihilistic choice 
of desire justified by reason, wrote that
the most important task for which autonomy has been harnessed in contemporary political 
philosophy is to argue for a certain ideal of the liberal state… The root idea is that the state must 
recognize and acknowledge the autonomy of persons.77
Rationality in such a case is tantamount to subjective choice, allegedly mo-
ral, but it is difficult to understand why it should be so. Thus, as David Gauthier 
writes,
the liberal individual is fully rational where rationality embraces both autonomy and the 
capacity to choose among possible actions on the basis of one’s conception of the good as deter-
mined by one’s reflective preferences… As an autonomous being, the liberal individual is aware 
of the reflective process by which her later selves emerge from her present self, so that her prefe-
rences are modified not in random or uncontrolled way, but in the light of her own experiences and 
understanding.78
The most canonical of such liberal egalitarians beginning with anthropology 
of subjective individual moral autocreation is John Rawls, for whom
acting autonomously is acting from principles that we would consent to as free and equal 
rational beings… They are the principles that we would want everyone, including ourselves, to 
follow were we to take up together the appropriate general point of view. The original position 
defines its perspective.79
75 In this case Justices Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor, and David Souter authored an opinion 
that defended a woman’s right to end her pregnancy by justifying that right by a new concept of liberty, in fact 
old but explicitly expressed in a Supreme Court opinion for the first time. They stated that “at the heart of liberty 
[as protected by the due process of clause] is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, and 
of the mystery of human life”. There is no word in the Constitution which of course acknowledges such a right 
rooted in a definite anthropological and ultimately ontological vision of who a human person is. In fact if this 
approach was accepted as a fact of life autonomous liberalism would have to allow all kinds of social practices, 
for instance of sharia law etc, to be recognized by law.
76 B. A. Acke rman, Social Justice and the Liberal State, New Haven 1980, p. 196.
77 R. Dwork in, Autonomy, [in:] A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. R. Good-
win, P. Petit, Oxford 1993, p. 361.
78 D. Gau th i e r, Morals by Agreement, Oxford 1986, p. 346.
79 J. Rawl s, A Theory of Justice, Harvard 1971, p. 518; and Political Liberalism, New York 1993, p. 72.
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Again John Raz states that “one common strand in liberal thought regards 
the promotion and protection of personal autonomy as the core of the liberal con-
cern”.80 And Alan Ryan adds that
the essence of liberalism is that individuals are self-creating, that no single good defines 
successful self-creation, and that taking responsibility for one’s life and making of it what one can 
is itself part of the good life.81
But if such an autonomous choice is part and parcel of a just, “good life”, 
with an equal and non-discriminatory society as its precondition, and individuals as 
Ryan defined them as “self-creating”, then it follows that such conditions when this 
choice of this autonomous life can be executed must be ensured, that is when abso-
lute tolerance of every choice is as good as anyone else’s choice, a road to coercion 
of every organization which prevents such a choice being possible into providing 
conditions of it being absolute, a clear recipe for a nihilistic approach. This thus 
entails an enforcement of toleration, in fact an enforcement of a particular morality 
which is at the same time no morality at all. It is in fact a requirement that everyone 
should be committed to reason and morality of one particular sort stemming from 
a particular narrow anthropology taken for granted as axiomatic. This is contrary to 
the liberal claim that its model is neutral towards conceptions of a “good life” that 
its proponents hold. 
Because if such a liberal morality of an autonomous choice has to be guaran-
teed, then in fact it has to be enforced, that is not to be tolerant or neutral towards 
competitive moral theories stemming from different anthropological concepts. 
Such a liberal society cannot be reasonable and neutral between conceptions of 
a “good life” that violate this basic moral identity rooted in an unrestrained autono-
mous choice. It cannot, in other words, treat with equal concern the protectors and 
violators of such a concept of a human being. For this reason such an
ideology of toleration is untenable. Egalitarians certainly tolerate some practices but equal-
ly certainly, they use the legal system to prohibit others. The real question is not whether toleration 
is good and enforcement bad but what, according to reason and morality should be tolerated and 
what should be enforced.82
For Mansfield it is obvious that, despite disclaimers, the war on men, and 
women, when such a liberal ideal of nondiscrimination based on an unrestrained 
guarantee of choice of an autonomous subject is accepted, can never end. Not only 
it can never end, but it provoces a corresponding vengeful response from men 
themselves, and equally bitter women, the vicious circle of recriminations which is 
the state of the real relations between sexes today. This has baleful consequences 
80 J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford 1986, p. 203.
81 A. Ryan, Liberalism, [in:] Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy..., p. 304.
82 J. Kekes, The Illusions of Egalitarianism..., p. 186.
76 ANDRZEJ BRYK
for both men and women, who after brutalizing their lives and dismantling the cul-
tural protections of their respective spheres, not only began to shout at each other, 
but simply are utterly baffled what to do with this mess. 
Mansfield thinks that the gender feminist approach in politics, law, educa-
tion and culture constitutes, in its later stages, even if granted the nobility of inten-
tion and not ulterior motives of power play and identity politics, a lame effort not 
to implement just and equal rights society, but that it mainly tries to deal, lamely, 
with the consequences of the ill-concocted feminist revolution. The approach to the 
sexual revolution is exactly a case in point. Feminists, writes Mansfield
were radicals, inspired by Simone de Beauvoir, [who] thought it necessary to show that all 
sex differences were bourgeois conventions or stereotypes. They would show this not so much in 
regard to careers as in sex itself. They bought into the sexual revolution and decided that women 
could best show they are equal to men by becoming as predatory as the most wolfish men. This 
demonstration required the fallback on abortion in case something should go wrong and it gave new 
legitimacy to – this word is never used – spinsterhood. Single-parent families also gained respecta-
bility as women pressed their husbands with newly justifiable equality grievances, often leading to 
divorce. As sex goes up in social estimation love goes down. The trouble with love is that it narrows 
your options and endangers your independence. If you loved a man, you might actually want to put 
up with, even admire, his ways. Feminist women are unerotic.83
This mess is caused by the fact that when there are
no sexual boundaries, either official or informal, the standard becomes the extreme. The 
traditional double standard of sexual conduct – more restricted for women than for men – has been 
replaced by the single standard of the predatory male… [For instance] according to one feminist 
professor of health – the head of a recent Harvard committee on student sexual relations – sex on 
campus should be ‘mature, respectful and life-affirming’. But instead it degrades both women and 
men. Women lose their sense of having a choice, to say nothing of ‘autonomy’, the supposed goal 
of sexual liberation. They feel compelled to offer a hook-up when they really want a date without 
expectation of sex. And yet they fear ‘getting a reputation’ for doing just what they are expected to 
do… College men, meanwhile degrade themselves by becoming callous. They behave like charm-
less Don Giovanni’s who cannot sing. They are indignant at girls who ‘want to spend time with 
guys during the day’. The nerve! One young man … concludes that it is more acceptable for girls 
to be virgins than boys because girls are ‘a more docile gender’. His experience has led him to 
speak in generalities about women – something supposedly now forbidden – and even to discern 
the traditional double standard in the very practices that are intended to destroy it. The only thing 
he has learned from promoters of sexual liberation is to say ‘gender’ instead of ‘sex’ … One is 
inclined to admire the students who attempt to meet the purity culture’s strict demands [existing at 
some Evangelical and Catholic colleges – AB]. But it is clear that such students often suffer deep 
anxiety in their search for a mate. The boys find it troublingly difficult to put off sex, and the girls 
are fearful that they will have failed in college if they do not get a “ring by spring” [of their senior 
year]. While students in the hook-up culture appear more promiscuous than they are, purity students 
appear more virtuous than they are.84
83 H. C. Mans f i e ld, Was Feminism Necessary?, “Forbes”, September 15, 2008.
84 H. C. Mans f i e ld, Hook-up or Shut Up, “The Wall Street Journal”, April 29, 2008.
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If, as one researcher concludes, sex is a yearning of the soul, something 
which goes contrary to the feminist slogan that sex is about power, then the secular 
colleges in the United States are a place of a frantic search for a “spiritual”, “me-
aningful” relationship, at least on the part of women. But for both sexes it is a chan-
ce for something bigger than the sheer animality of sex, whatever the appearances. 
But both sexes would like
to have a shot at the romance, from older times, they have read about. But romance requires 
holding back and no one [in such colleges] has a respectable reason for doing so … Colleges find 
it risky … to oppose the hook-up culture. They do not boast of it when parents visit, but they are 
happy to look the other way throughout the year. Their main concern is to be sure that they cannot 
be accused of treating men and women differently, and they do not care, or do not see, that the end 
result of sexual liberation is a culture that does harm to young people caught within it. [There is no 
easy way out], because there isn’t one. But it makes us eager for something better than the going-on 
at colleges today, or anywhere else.85
This yearning for something higher of which sex is just a tool and which the 
young call today romantic love is in fact a yearning – all cultures and religions have 
known it – for transcendental love, of which sex is just a gateway to an understan-
ding that such an understanding, even fleetingly on this earth, is possible. And this 
is the very essence of happy life, something which the liberal feminist approach 
cannot even comprehend, let alone provide.
To radical feminists, all men are more or less subconsciously enemies or de-
scendants of the enemies in need of constant self-justification, a worthy target upon 
which to project rage, more or less subconscious, for not being able to achieve all 
the positive goals women want, the latter still having inferior positions in society, 
while forced to accept men’s game as a precondition of winning. As for men, who 
have been vilified and maligned and in principle have refused to defend themse-
lves, they responded in another, less documented way. For them such a vilification 
of themselves has elicited in a large part a hidden contempt and an instrumental 
attitude towards women, with the sexual revolution as its main tool. This revolution 
in the plans of feminists was to liberate women, putting them on a par with men, 
but in fact liberated men, who for thousands of years dreamed of having unlimited 
access to women without any consequences and commitments. 
Mansfield thinks that the sexual revolution, being a fact of life, was enor-
mously aided by the gender feminist ideology. Manliness came out at such a time 
of Western civilization in which the utter ugliness of the gender feminist revolu-
tion both for men and women has become increasingly visible, with both sides 
not liking such a state of affairs and not knowing what to do about it. Something 
which was to bring equality, happiness and understanding, has brought mutual, 
deep mistrust, brutalization of sex between people, a demanding attitude towards 
each other and a torrent of programs on the part of government via law and edu-
85 Ibidem.
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cational system to impose in subtle ways some axioms of the feminist ideology, 
with affirmative action, divorce and custody proceedings, sexual harassment laws 
endemically biased against men.
Mansfield is a fierce critic of gender-neutral civilization, although he reco-
gnizes the fact of its existence. He points out that there are definitely traits of a con-
temporary civilization in which women have an increasing advantage due precisely 
to their different traits of character, as for instance the increasing bureaucratization 
of human conduct. But he realizes that with gender-neutral civilization, once it is 
being recognized as the only legitimate one, with the role models defined as traits 
of oppressive culture abandoned and in need of legal and cultural delegitimization, 
we are on the road to a total abolishment of human freedom, since such a civiliza-
tion excludes just the diversity of mutual relations in the privacy of contacts betwe-
en the sexes, and it has to elicit massive social engineering. 
As a dogma the roles between the sexes are to be, in the radical feminist 
perspective, absolutely interchangeable and thus endlessly negotiable. But that re-
quires social engineering of a society in which the endless search by the feminist 
police for instances where the sexes act differently is a constant threat. Such dif-
ferences, by definition, can never be for gender feminists an expression of natural 
differences, but they must obviously constitute an instance of a criminal behavior 
in need of instant rectifying. For Mansfield, and he is here in the company of other 
wise people, the idiocy of such an endeavor is obvious. Not only is there no way the 
end point of such a reform can be envisioned, but what is being defined as equality 
in a gender-neutral civilization is an equality defined by feminist “experts” of this 
particular time and place, a kind of modern oligarchy imposing its particular view 
on a pluralistic society. What is supposed to be the widest possible extension of the 
equal and non-discriminatory concept of life between men and women turns out to 
be an ideal of a narrow group which sets up its standard of such a life.
Manliness is of course a notoriously difficult concept to define, and if man-
liness meant what the radical feminists wanted it to be, that is animal aggression, 
traditionally aimed at women, and also the feeling of brutal aggression for the sake 
of self-preservation or self-aggrandizement, then there would be no chance of de-
fending it. But definitely there is a rule of thumb, corroborated by all research, 
that there are real differences between the sexes, though not in every case. Social 
science shows that sex differences are deeply rooted, since they are the product of 
evolution. That would not necessarily mean that such features are today any more 
needed, but Mansfield thinks that that is exactly the point. For him in general, 
manliness stands in for a universal human need to have some importance in the 
cosmos, and the human need to feel that humans matter on some deep level seems 
here only natural. But it is first of all a willingness to fight and defend oneself, and 
here to sacrifice for honor or for a cause – in all walks of life and in different garbs.
79HARVEY MANSFIELD AND VIRTUE...
For this very reason, manliness constitutes a profoundly creative force in hu-
man relations,86 even if it can also be a destructive force. It was a creative force, since 
the Western civilization in its intellectual and technological aspect was built mainly 
by men. This was done, of course, with the very strong and essential complementa-
ry role of women, but there is no doubt that manliness was an extremely powerful 
creative force, including the Christian aspect of it. It was also a destructive force, 
because there is inherently nothing in such a concept which ensures that a cause for 
which manly men sacrifice themselves is a genuinely praiseworthy one; in fact it 
harbors within it the possibility of real terror. But it does not follow from this that it 
would be well if we could just abolish manliness; in fact a sense of reality tells us that 
something might be profoundly wrong, and the confused and frustrated attitudes of 
contemporary women towards men exhibit this longing for something, which they 
willingly wanted to kill and in large measures have been successful in doing. Com-
plementarity of the sexes has always been a great cultural power and a source of their 
mutual psychological safety rest.
Mansfield not only believes that there are separate natures of men and wo-
men and beyond the public sphere their mutual relationships should be left to them 
as private persona. He also believes that radical, gender-neutral civilization based 
on meticulous rights codes does not create equal society, but a society of warring 
parties vying for power, a situation which could not lead to a civilization in which 
men and women can finally rest in their mutual company. As there is manly ni-
hilism which “tries to make self-assertion the core of the human good, womanly 
nihilism takes the opposite track and tries to suppress manliness”, with radical fe-
minism here meaning such feminism “that seeks the essential problem not just as 
individual men behaving badly but as human [man’s] nature itself”.87 Moreover, 
such a civilization is increasingly based on a hidden assumption, which radical 
feminists have sealed into dogma without realizing what has happened, that there 
are separate fates of men and women fighting for respect and rights within a cul-
ture which is increasingly questionable. If this assumption of a lack of separate, in 
fact, natures of men and women is even subconsciously taken for granted, then we 
have here the first civilization which looks at the relations between the sexes in such 
a way. All hitherto, so much different, civilizations and religions claimed exactly the 
opposite. There are of course no separate fates for men and women; this is one fate, 
although it is not easy to adjust both sexes to each other.88 This assumption of eternal 
enmity and fight for rights and entitlements, aided with a torrent of clichés such as 
“respect”, “diversity”, “equality” at every sphere, kills the very logic, essence and 
hope of an opposite assumption without which the eternal thirst for romantic love 
and truly lasting commitment seems to be an illusion.
86 See on that an interesting elaboration by C. Pag l i a, The M.I.T Lecture, in he r  Sex, Art and the 
American Politics, New York 1992, p. 273–274.
87 T. Mer r i l l, Manliness, “Society”, March–April 2007, p. 100.
88 See on that profound truth K. Minogue, How Civilizations Fail, “The New Criterion”, April 2001, 
p. 12.
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Non-radical gender feminists could object that Mansfield has chosen as an 
object of his critique the most extreme form of feminism, and for this very reason 
this critique does not hold true for other, less comprehensive and radical feminists. 
This might be true, of course, but Mansfield recognizes that manliness, as well as 
femininity, poses a perennial practical as well as theoretical problem. For this very 
reason, as one commentator observed, there will always be, as there has always, in 
fact, been in different civilizations,
a natural ground for something like feminism, a counterbalance to manliness. What that 
other feminism [what sort of gender feminism – AB] might look like is hard to say... His practical 
proposal – a prudent mixing of gender neutrality in public and recognition and encouragement of 
sex differences in private – leave quite a bit of room for ongoing controversy about the right place 
to draw the line. We should not however, allow this reasonable objection to blur Mansfield’s deeper 
point. Radical feminism is usefully illuminating precisely because its utopianism is so extreme.89
For this reason Mansfield makes his strongest theoretical statement about 
human nature, with different natures between men and women as its two insepara-
ble dovetailed parts, on the basis of his reflections on radical feminism.
The revolution that made the gender-neutral society was not led by liberals but by women 
of the left, inspired … by a womanly nihilism. Their heroine was Simone de Beauvoir, and behind 
her, Marx and Nietzsche. The feminists were highly critical of liberals and of liberal principles as 
well. Although the women’s movement followed close upon the civil rights movement, it took a very 
different path. Civil rights leaders in the 1960s, above all Martin Luther King, called on America to 
be true to itself, to live by principles it had long proclaimed, and to cease the hypocrisy of talking one 
way and acting another. The feminists did no such things. Although of course they denounced male 
hypocrisy, they did not take liberal principles for a measure. Liberal principles were inherently faul-
ty and inevitably hypocritical because they were formal…gave everyone a formal right to equality 
but deliberately refrained from examining whether formal equality was made actual. Under formal, 
liberal equality, feminists said, women were at an actual disadvantage… 90
In so arguing, feminists were echoing a long-standing complaint against li-
beral formalism, perhaps stated best in Karl Marx’s On the Jewish Question (1844), 
that the unlovely informal practices of liberalism cancel out its published princi-
ples. Another way to put the objection is to say that in liberal society, the public, 
the sphere of the formal, is in fact governed by the private sphere so that the public 
promise of equality is betrayed. ‘The personal is the political’ is the feminist formu-
la for that point: women have been confined and oppressed by the liberal distinction 
between personal or private and political or public, which was intended for conce-
alment of the fraud. Moreover, 
the formula suggests, the way to reform is by the same route as the betrayal – by politicizing 
the personal, but now in reverse, in favor of the gender-neutral society, for the purpose of ending 
oppression. Martin Luther King did not resort to this Marxist argument… [In general] feminism 
89 T. Mer r i l l, Manliness..., p. 100.
90 H. C. Mans f i e ld, Manliness, p. 161, 163.
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wants transcendence over previous definitions of womanhood. This is what it learned from Simone 
de Beauvoir, who learned transcendence from Nietzsche. But it wants transcendence for the sake 
of independence, and the trouble is that the two are not consistent. Independence means that you 
are satisfied with yourself; transcendence means that you are not. In relations between the sexes 
independence means that you do not need the other sex because you do not want to be dependent on 
it: transcendence means that you do need it because you want more than your own sex. Feminism is 
not to be blamed for this inconsistency. Not only feminists, but all human beings want completion 
and incompletion in this way. Homosexuals would admit that society depends on heterosexuals. It 
is the utopian fervor of feminism that brings out the difficulty. Which is otherwise concealed by 
the complacency of conversion… The gender-neutral society does not know whether to ignore the 
sexual difference (independence) or abolish it (transcendence).91
But radical feminists’ tinkering with human nature as such, so to obliterate 
differences between the sexes, depends in fact on the very thing which this femi-
nism is trying to extirpate. This is so because, to begin a massive project of social 
engineering for the whole reconstruction of human nature or natures, in order to 
get rid of male aggressiveness, requires precisely deep reserves of human will-
fulness and aggressiveness as such. One has only to look at the constant wailing 
and aggressiveness of the programs of many radical feminists, often sponsored 
by public money, operating with phrases such as “wars on”, “campaigns against”, 
“crusades for” etc. But Mansfield, criticizing radical feminism, does it in the same 
way Socrates used the idealism of Glaucon and Adimantus in Plato’s “Republic”. 
In both cases utopia is crazy, it shows the limits of politics to realize human wild 
wishes of an absolute just society, meaning in fact a wish to liquidate an alienation 
between painful reality and a possible potential to overcome it. Utopianism, with 
all its crazy and self-contradictory ideas, can yet be useful as an object of study, 
since it is precisely utopianism which allows us to see the limits of politics. This 
study of an incurable, dangerous dream enable us to recognize, finally, the limits of 
human nature per se.
Mansfield is of course an equity feminist, recognizing the need for equal ri-
ghts in the public sphere, rights as a choice, or better to say chance for a choice, not 
a demand to use it as a precondition of equal status. But he recognizes the danger of 
a situation in which blindness to the differences in natures between sexes excludes 
the possibility of a truly loving relationship based on trust and commitment, out of 
a deep understanding of a need for it, so as to lead a meaningful life. Such a rela-
tionship can never be defined, let alone formed, by feminist “experts” using state 
machinery, so as to impose their hidden agenda of power grab on countless lives 
of men and women making their lives miserable, and making sure that they cannot 




If one attempts to find an ever present disposition of a character and soul which 
propels Mansfield’s political philosophy, it is his conservatism, understood in its 
best and only proper meaning. Mansfield is a thinker in the great tradition of the 
classical and Christian quest for truth. The quest concerned more with the eternal 
than with the immediate, with this tradition of human intellectual and moral stri-
vings which demands from human beings an effort to look incessantly up, not insi-
de themselves, so to be better than they themselves, as human animals, are. This is 
a gargantuan civilizational, intellectual and ethical struggle which looks at human 
life as a cosmic drama of existence not of one’s own choosing, but also not of one’s 
own total autocreation, which is the other side of nihilistic despair.
Mansfield inspects a human life and the political life in it as a fascinating 
heroic endeavor to make one’s life meaningful in a modern liberal society of the 
late welfare administrative state, trying to find out what a constitutional government 
of free people in it means. This is the state and society in which, increasingly, one 
can create one’s own story as one likes and can do anything with it, and in which, 
because of exactly that, nothing in fact may matter any more. His endeavor is to seek 
and to restore gravity in political thinking, and as a consequence gravity of one’s 
life, since, in fact, political philosophy is for him in the last resort a moral adven-
ture. Mansfield analyzes and partially reworks a tremendous amount of traditional 
sources of classical and modern political philosophy, including his contemporary 
one of the hegemonic Western liberalism. The latter began with an individual and its 
autonomy principle, and it has provided us with the most common understanding of 
liberty, subconsciously taken for granted as the only conceivably frame for human 
existence. 
It has constantly evolved and at this late point in time has increasingly been 
understood as a faculty of an autonomous “self”, decoupled from tradition, culture, 
and last but not least, from metaphysics. But the end station of such a development 
might be the utter human loneliness and a pantheistic, quietismic despair. Mans-
field refuses to give such a liberalism the last word on the human condition, being 
convinced that a rescue can also come from human capacity for recovery of what 
has been lost, through a thoughtful application of reason and heart. If Western libe-
ralism, and with that the Western civilization, at this hour of unprecedented wealth 
and benevolence, is increasingly losing hope of providing any reason why it should 
persevere and why it should inspire anybody, it is because it has cut itself off from 
the throve of the human wisdom accumulated in time, that wisdom which political 
philosophy can help recover. Recover, not to solve the mystery of human existence 
which is beyond human mind to comprehend, but so to simply realize that it is possi-
ble to join ranks with the giants born before us, who knew that, as the great Aragorn, 
putting on his armor, stated to a terrified boy before the battle in the Helm’s gorge: 
”There is always Hope!”.
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In fact, hope is the last and the very key word of Mansfield’s opus. Hope 
is rational because it is metaphysical, and it is metaphysical because it is rational. 
Hope as a citizen of America, the America which Mansfield loves. He understands 
that what is at stake in contemporary America, and there is at this hour much at sta-
ke, is her proper understanding of herself, a necessary condition of a sense of self-
identity and self-confidence, in the case of both an individual and the entire people. 
This proper self-understanding which America seems to have lost, since it has lost 
the innocence of this instinctual self-evidence of the words of this quintessentially 
American document, for a long time considered also universal, the Declaration of 
Independence of 1776. But if the self-evident assumptions of the Americans cannot 
sustain the nation any more than there is an urgent need to provide at once reasoned 
grounds for their essential affirmation that they are, because they are exceptional 
people, a uniquely free people.92
Mansfield has provided such reasoned grounds in all his works. He is con-
cerned with America, as was Tocqueville, since he knows by instinct that America 
is, somehow, a universal civilization and a loss of direction poses a danger of lo-
sing its identity, which as psychiatry defines it, is another name for insanity, when 
a theological name for such a loss is hell. Both for America and the world itself. 
In all that Mansfield is, in a particular sense, in love with America. He is part of 
this Burkean understanding that man is nothing if not of a particular place and 
time. In other words to be universal one has to be local first, since if universalism 
has to mean anything it has to mean something more than a cheap sentimentality 
of “loving” humanity, gestures which cost nothing but sell well in a contemporary 
politically correct market of “actions” or “wars on”. To be universal means first 
to acquire the habits of responsibility, duty, affection, habits of bonds towards the 
immediate world, which then translate into the loving and ultimately true charity 
towards all. One has to learn to love somewhere, so as to be able to practice it, an 
Aristotelian impulse.
Thus, for Mansfield as a political philosopher and an intellectual in the clas-
sical sense of a lover of truth, America is an object of his great concern and a ri-
gorous reasoned argument coupled inseparably with love. He would agree with St. 
Anselm, that what is really true and worth doing is to apply reason so to seek this, 
which one loves. And the more one loves, the more one tries to learn about it. This 
is Mansfield’s America. But we need hope as citizens of the liberal world or citizens 
of the world, and here Mansfield immerses himself in the great tradition of giants 
before us, knowing the fallacy of thinking that we are the last, and that because of 
that, we can see through Being as better or much wiser than those who were our 
predecessors. In fact, what the intellectual and moral search is all about is an eternal 
return to the Sources, so we can understand that politics is not all to life and can 
never quench our thirst for fulfillment, however it tries and whatever calamities it 
may still bring to history. 
92 G. We ige l, Truths Still Held?, “First Things”, May 2010, p. 47.
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But the ultimate meaning is somewhere else, and this gives us hope. Becau-
se, although existentially
the time of tribulation is upon us, and we now must make our way through its darkness, 
guided only by the waning lights of memory and the flickering flame of hope, not knowing when 
the night will end, [we are] sustained by the sacred assurance that whoever perseveres to the end 
shall be saved.93
Harvey Mansfield chose a long time ago the path of knowledge so to acquire 
wisdom. Wisdom brings disillusionment, the mother of Hope. Wisdom is Hope, 
because it understands that reason without love is sterile as it is useless. But wis-
dom is reason with heart, and Mansfield knows, that in the end that means silence. 
Silence and magnitude.
93 D. B. Ha r t, A Perfect Game, “First Things”, August–September 2010, p. 55.
